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Underground Nuclear Test Explosion 4 May

LD0405021388 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0156 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] [No dateline as received]—An underground nuclear explosion with a capacity of between 20 and 150 kilotonnes was carried out in the Soviet Union at the testing ground in the region of Semipalatinsk on 4 May 1988 at 0500 Moscow time [0100 GMT].

This test was carried out for the purposes of improving military equipment.

'Practically No Progress' at Disarmament Talks

LD0305194888 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 3 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The spring session of the Disarmament Conference has ended its work in Geneva.

[Correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev, identified by caption] The development of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the conventions banning bacteriological weapons, and other significant international accords currently in force are all associated with Geneva and the Disarmament Conference.

In the last few years, tangible headway has been made in preparing a convention banning chemical weapons, but in the course of the present session, that work has made practically no progress.

The delegations of the countries participating in the conference discussed a wide range of subjects, although the bulk of attention was focused on coordinating the articles of the convention banning chemical weapons. The Soviet Union made a number of specific proposals at that session, in particular on multilateral exchanges in information on the general stocks of chemical weapons, on incidents involving their manufacture, handover, or reception. The Soviet Union has supplied such information. About 25 states have reported no chemical weapons in their possession. The United States has refused to publish data concerning the volume of its stocks, and is continuing the manufacture of binary weapons.

Many Western delegations, following the United States, hedged the discussion of some key points of the convention with a range of technical issues, which not infrequently were of no essential significance. Such was the state of affairs at the session. Judging from everything, it will still take quite a while before the convention is concluded.

Further Criticism of Carlucci Interview on SDI

LD0305141588 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci has alleged in an interview for the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL that the Soviet Union has altered its negative attitude to the American Strategic Defence Initiative program, nicknamed Star Wars. Yuriy Solton has prepared this commentary:

Mr Carlucci's statement seems to be inaccurate. The Soviet Union has always considered as faulty the idea of orbiting strike weapons. It realized that idea would disrupt the efforts being made toward ending the arms race and would lead to a military competition in space that could have unpredictable effects beyond human control.

At the Geneva talks with the United States on reducing by half the strategic offensive arsenals, the Soviet Union has been insisting that both sides comply with the antiballistic missile treaty in its 1972 form. It says the sides must abide by the treaty within an agreed term. The treaty bans the development of a space-based antimissile system that could be used equally for defensive and offensive purposes.

The Geneva talks do not discuss SDI. The Americans are in their rights to continue with the program at their laboratories, factories, and testing sites as long as they do not break the antiballistic missile treaty. The crucial thing is to prevent militarization of space. Moscow has suggested that a commission of experts be set up to define what space systems must be banned. It will never give a go-ahead, though, for developing space weapons under SDI or any other program.

This position of principle is well known to the Washington administration, including Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci. So why was Mr Carlucci distorting facts in his interview for DER SPIEGEL? It seems he was doing that deliberately. The American team at Geneva has been searching for loopholes to circumvent the provisions of the antiballistic missile treaty, blocking the space part of the Star Wars program.

That blind adherence to SDI has been one of the main obstacles in working out an agreement on strategic weapons which the two sides initially planned to sign during their next month's summit in Moscow. It looks like Mr Carlucci was making obviously false claims about Moscow's altered attitude to SDI in an attempt to mislead world opinion, which has rightly been blaming Washington for the delay at Geneva.

Editorial Highlights East Bloc's Peaceful Role
PM0304085988 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 88 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Unity, Solidarity, Cooperation"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Socialism's problems and prospects are closely tied up with the problems and prospects for all mankind's development. The socialist community is a most prestigious force of the day and not a single question of world policy can be resolved without it. It is the firm bastion of peace on earth, the most consistent champion of healthy, peaceful, and democratic principles in international relations, and the main obstacle to imperialist reaction. In contrast to imperialism's concepts of hegemonism and all-out confrontation, the new political thinking, by which the fraternal socialist countries are guided, calls for all states to enter into partnership and to cooperate in resolving global questions, above all questions of war and peace, respect for the rights of every people to freely choose their path of development, and the establishment of civilized relations between all countries. Socialism and peace are indivisible. The class interests of socialist countries' working people fully coincide with all mankind's priority interests today and with mankind's desire to preserve life on earth.

It is profoundly logical that the countries of the socialist community are acting as innovators in international life and acting as initiators of the shaping of an all-embracing system of international peace and security. Fraternal socialist countries counter the concepts of nuclear and other armed deterrence with their honest and totally comprehensible idea of mutual respect, balance of interests, and the affirmation of glasnost and openness in international affairs. This is the essence of an all-embracing system of security of a comprehensive character. It must be set up in all spheres: be it disarmament, regional conflicts, world economic ties, environmental preservation, defense of human rights, or the development of humanitarian cooperation.

While acting jointly, the fraternal countries of socialism are not slackening off in their efforts to further develop and strengthen the positive trends in the international situation. They regard the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles as only the first step, which must be followed by new agreements aimed at reducing strategic offensive armaments, preventing the arms race in space, achieving a general and complete ban on nuclear tests, eliminating nuclear, chemical, and other types of weapons of mass destruction, reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, cutting military expenditure, and resolving other questions of security and disarmament.

Given the need to definitively eliminate war from mankind's life, to stop the arms race, to exclude the use of military might, to strengthen peace and security, and to implement general and complete disarmament, the Warsaw Pact states have clearly expounded the fundamental provisions of their military doctrine, which is the basis of Warsaw Pact activity and reflects the commonality of the defensive military-political aims of its states and of their national military doctrines.

The fraternal socialist countries put forward new constructive initiatives at the latest session in Sofia of the Committee of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers. They addressed an urgent appeal to NATO countries and to all European states to take advantage of the historic chance and to continue by joint efforts the movement along the path of disarmament and of consolidating security and cooperation in all spheres.

In their international policy, the fraternal states of the socialist community creatively combine initiative with a common concerted line. Their approach to world affairs demonstrates that it is socialism which is designed to be and can be the true pioneer for humanizing international relations and that its supreme goal is man. Restructuring, democratization, and the acceleration of socioeconomic development in the countries of the socialist community have a decisive influence on the growth of socialism's potential and the strengthening of the forces of peace and progress. This found expression in the words of the CPSU Central Committee 1 May slogan:

"Peoples of the socialist countries! May our countries' fraternal cooperation deepen and strengthen for the sake of socialism and peace."

Bloc Bank Officials Meet in Leningrad
PM271337 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, Apr 88 (Signed to Press 21 Apr 88) p 3

[TASS report: "Session Held"]

[Text] The 68th session of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation [IBEC] Council was held in Leningrad 14-15 April. Taking part in it were delegations from the following bank council member countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, the SRV, the GDR, the Republic of Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR, as well as representatives of the CEMA Secretariat and the International Investment Bank. The session was also attended by representatives of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, who took part in the Council's session on the basis of the cooperation agreement between IBEC and the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and by representatives of the National Bank of Angola, the Da Afghanistan Bank, the Bank of Yemen (Aden), the Lao People's Democratic Republic State Bank, the Bank of Mozambique, the Bank of Finland, the State Bank of India, the African Development Bank, the International Settlements Bank, and the European Investment Bank who were invited to attend the IBEC Council session as observers. The session was chaired by G. Khuderchulun [name as published], head of the Mongolian delegation on the bank council and chairman of the Mongolian State Bank Board.

Having approved IBEC's activity during last year, the council noted its active role in the development of the national economy of bank member countries, the deepening of their trade, economic, scientific, and technical collaboration in the new conditions, and the expansion of foreign economic ties with other states.

The council approved the report on the bank's activity in 1987, the balance sheet as of 1 January 1988, the distribution of profits for 1987, and IBEC's credit plan for the current year. It examined comprehensive measures to improve and enhance the efficiency of the bank's payments and credit mechanism in convertible rubles, as well as measures to provide credits and effect payments under the new forms of economic cooperation between member countries, including the use of national currencies by interested countries. It adopted measures aimed at stepping up joint actions by member countries to strengthen contractual discipline and to develop direct production ties and the activity of international economic organizations and joint enterprises.

Other questions of IBEC's activity were examined.

The council's session proceeded in an atmosphere of friendship, comradely cooperation, and full mutual understanding.

United States & Canada

Astrology's Influence on Reagans Reported

LD0405115588 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0825 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 4 May (TASS)—TASS commentator Maksim Knyazkov writes: It's difficult to say what the star-studded night sky has foretold for the President in these May days. But evidently not that he would have to speak about the role of astrology in the policies of the United States.

But nevertheless it happened. Appearing on Tuesday in one of the ceremonial halls of the White House, President Reagan was literally bombarded with questions from journalists concerning the degree to which all sorts of astrologists and fortune-tellers influence his political decisionmaking. "Neither policies nor any decision were ever elaborated or made by me under the influence of astrology," the President quickly found his feet, but...he tried to evade direct answers to further questions.

These questions, however, were not asked by accident. The point is that in the last few days, quite a few reports have appeared in the U.S. press indicating that astrology, which maintains that the positions of the heavenly bodies affects events on earth, is far from being last in playing a part in U.S. politics.

It all began when some of the facts from the memoirs now being prepared for publication by Donald Regan, former leader of the White House employees' apparatus who was dismissed last year at the height of "Irangate," leaked to the press. Some people maintain that Regan's dismissal was especially sought by the President's spouse, Nancy Reagan, since at one time he attempted to limit her role in state affairs.

It is not impossible that in his book the former presidential aide decided to spite the one who had slighted him. But one way or another, according to, in particular, THE WASHINGTON POST newspaper and NEWSWEEK magazine, Regan reports in his book that, prior to making any important political decision, the Reagan couple without fail "consult" an astrologist. If one is to believe Regan, the President's working schedule, and above all the time of his major political speeches and tours, is determined by Nancy Reagan only after consultations with an expert on heavenly bodies.

Is it true? To this and other similar questions, the official White House representative, Marlin Fitzwater, replied evasively: "She is quite concerned for her husband's well-being and the interest in astrology is part of her concern...." It also follows from Fitzwater's pronouncements that the interest in astrology of the President himself, who was born under the sign of Aquarius, is manifested through the reading of horoscopes.

All this, however, has not provided answers to the questions being raised. And now, more and more Americans are asking themselves: Maybe the President indeed plots the political course of the country...by the stars?

U.S. Resolution on Religious Repression Viewed

LD0305201588 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1900 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 3 May (TASS)—TASS political observer Anatoliy Krasikov writes:

According to reports from Washington, U.S. President Ronald Reagan has signed a resolution of the U.S. Congress which "expresses regret at the active repressions of believers in the Ukraine by the Soviet Government". The resolution, timed to coincide with the festivities marking the 1,000th anniversary of Christianity in Russia, contains, in particular, an appeal to the U.S. Administration to refrain from official participation in these festivities in the USSR "as long as repressions and arrests of persons in connection with their religious convictions continue, as long as access to religious literature and to the opportunities of obtaining religious instruction are curtailed, and also as long as the legal ban on the Ukrainian Catholic and the Ukrainian Orthodox churches remains in force".

In March of this year, when the draft resolution was only just under review, a statement was submitted to Congress by a group of deputies from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet—the supreme organ of state power of one of the 15 Soviet republics. This statement protested against transatlantic interference in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian people. Had heed been paid in the United States to the voice of the Ukrainian parliamentarians, we would not need today to comment upon a document which can be described as nothing other than a monument to the crass incompetence of those who drew it up.

Now, however, we have to inform the congressmen and the President: Functioning normally in the Ukraine there are more than 4,000 Orthodox parishes, over 1,000 Christian Baptist houses of prayer, over 100 Catholic churches, Pentecostal houses of prayer, synagogues, and other places where religious rites are conducted.

In connection with the approach of celebrations to mark the 1,000th anniversary of the Baptism of Russian in the USSR, a mass-circulation jubilee edition of the Bible is being published. A large consignment of religious literature, including the Bible, is coming as a gift to Soviet Christians from coreligionists abroad. The restrictions on the importation of such literature into the USSR which existed in the past have been lifted. Finally—and this is of particular importance—a new law on freedom of conscience is currently being drawn up, which will also reflect the interests of religious organizations.

Of course, not all questions have yet been settled with regard to the implementation in the USSR of the constitutional right of citizens to profess any religion or not to profess any. However, these questions are being decided in the interests of all USSR citizens, both believers and nonbelievers, under conditions of restructuring and the democratization of Soviet society.

It is laughable and naive to suggest that this is being done out of consideration for external effect, in order to please someone abroad. The members of the U.S. Congress and the U.S. President can sleep easy: Their hopelessly unrealistic appeals provoke only an ironic smile in the USSR. It will be better if they take up problems of freedom of conscience at home: So far as we know, there are quite a few people in the United States (including the upper echelons) who, while advertising their own piety, demonstrate by their whole way of life that faith for them is no more than a covering for extremely unevangelical doings.

Finally, about the "threat" that a U.S. representative will not take part in the festivities marking 1,000 years of Christianity in Russia. Well, that is their affair. No one intends to drag anyone else off by force to the USSR. It would be better, though, if those on the other side of the ocean paid heed to the words by the Ukrainian Exarch, Kiev and Galicia, Metropolitan Filaret, which he uttered in February during a meeting with Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. "We hope," stated the religious figure, "that our anniversary will facilitate not only an expansion of ties between churches, but also a strengthening of trust between East and West—the trust that we find is in short supply today."

Juridical Official on U.S. Press Disinformation

LD0305183888 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 3 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with Aleksandr Sukharev, president of the Soviet Jurists' Association and USSR first deputy prosecutor general, by television commentator Vadim Lobachenko]

[Text] A reply to the U.S. press disinformation: Here is our commentator Vadim Lobachenko's interview with Sukharev, president of the Soviet Jurists' Association and USSR first deputy prosecutor general.

[Begin recording] [Lobachenko] Aleksandr Yakovlevich, the information service of the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES has published David Margulick's [name as heard] article, containing sharp attacks on the Soviet Jurists' Association and on your ties with your U.S. colleagues. Why, in your view, did this take place precisely at this time and why is it that your association was singled out?

[Sukharev] It was our U.S. colleagues who laid the foundations for the resumption of contacts between the two associations. From the very beginning, we felt that there appeared within that association—and it is rather large, with 340,000 jurists—a group consisting of, I would say, people with extremist leanings, who are none too pleased with the normalization of Soviet-U.S. relations in general and juridical relations in particular. Another congress of the U.S. Association of Jurists is due to take place soon. At the congress, the opponents of agreement will yet again attempt to foist upon that association a discussion on the lawfulness of this agreement and who benefits from it, and they will attempt to wreck this agreement.

Our two countries are on the eve of a major historical event: the Moscow summit meeting, the Soviet-U.S. meeting. I reckon that here our opponents also pursue this goal—to impede this meeting as much as possible.

[Lobachenko] What is striking here is the language the article uses, in particular, this expression—I will quote it for you: The Soviet Association of Jurists is more anti-semitic than Joseph Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda.

[Sukharev] How our foes must have fallen if they have to resort to such base, slanderous methods! We know that it is not just our Soviet association. Numerous democratic organizations are also under fire from Zionist circles because of our consistent and principled defense of the Palestinian people's rights, because of our exposure of the misanthropic ideas and actions of Israel's Zionist circles, and of those in the West who protect these circles. If we are jurists, we ought to defend human rights always and everywhere. [end recording]

Northeast Asia

Japanese Communist Party Group Visits Moscow

Met by Dobrynin at Airport

LD021429 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 2 May 88

[Text] Moscow, 2 May (TASS)—A delegation of leading officials of the Communist Party of Japan [JCP] headed by Tetsuzo Fuwa, deputy chairman of the JCP, arrived in Moscow today at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

At the airport the delegation was met by Anatoliy Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and executives of the CPSU Central Committee.

Gorbachev To Receive Fuwa

OW0305143488 Tokyo KYODO in English 1345 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 3 KYODO—The Japan Communist Party's No. 2 figure, Tetsuzo Fuwa, will have a one-on-one private meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbahcev at 11 a.m. Wednesday, JCP officials said Tuesday.

Nobody else, except an interpreter, will be present.

Fuwa, who flew to Moscow Monday, talked with Soviet Communist Party Secretariat member Vladimir Dobrynin over lunch for two hours on Tuesday.

Ryuytel Attends Japanese Ambassador's Reception

PM0305100888 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 88 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Announcements"]

[Text] On the occasion of the national holiday, Toshiaki Muto, Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, held a reception on 29 April.

It was attended by A.F. Ryuytel, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, leaders of a number of ministries and departments, and other officials.

Japanese Socialist Interviewed on USSR Trip

OW0405044488 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 29 Apr 88

[Excerpt] A delegation of the Association for the Defense of the Constitution of Japan recently visited the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. During the delegation's visit in the USSR from 18 to 27 April, a Radio Moscow reporter interviewed its leader, Kosuke Uehara, member of the House of Representatives and vice chairman of the Japan Socialist Party [JSP] ad hoc committee on Japan-USSR relations. In the interview, Mr Uehara made the following comments:

[Begin recording] [Uehara] Speaking of the motivation, or rather the purpose of our visit to the Soviet Union at this time, the Secretariat of the Association for the Defense of the Constitution of Japan informed me of the invitation extended to me by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace to visit. The delegation is composed of executive officials of organizations in prefectures where U.S. military bases are located. I was asked to lead the association's visit because I am a JSP member of the lower house from the constituency of Okinawa Prefecture, and my experience includes a visit to the USSR 3 years ago as a JSP representative. Moreover, I myself was willing to positively respond to such requests concerning relations with the Soviet Union. That is why I am here today.

[Reporter] Would you comment on your impression of the visit?

[Uehara] Thanks to the warm consideration of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, we met primarily with members and executive officials of the committee in Moscow. We also visited the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, the World Economics and International Relations Institute, the Far East Institute, the United States of America and Canada Institute, the economics, (?scientific, and mathematics institutes), and such cities as Leningrad and Tallin. It was of utmost significance that everywhere we went, we exchanged views with local members of the Committee for the Defense of Peace and people working for USSR-Japan friendship. The members of the delegation, 10 of them altogether, are very happy with the successful visit. We have done everything we planned to do.

[Reporter] What were the themes that interested delegation members most during the visit?

[Uehara] First of all, we, members of the Association for the Defense of the Constitution of Japan, are engaged in the struggle against nuclear arms and for disarmament, against military bases and the Japan-U.S. security treaty, and for peace. Internationally, the INF Treaty was signed in December last year, and more recently the Afghan peace talks achieved a settlement. In the meantime, another meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan—the third such meeting, I believe—is scheduled for late May. Thus, the international trend toward nuclear disarmament is also gaining momentum. We wanted to see more active involvement of our people in international public opinion against nuclear arms and for disarmament, both at national levels and among activists. This was a major purpose for our visit at this time. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Japan's 'Marubeni' To Join Petrochemical Project

OW250825 Tokyo KYODO in English 0800 GMT 25 Apr 88

[Text] Tokyo, April 25 KYODO—Marubeni Corp. will participate in a joint venture project to produce petrochemical products in Tungus oil field in eastern Siberia of the Soviet Union, a Soviet official said Monday.

V.A. Rudnev, general manager of Soyuzkhimexport, a trading arm of the Soviet Ministry of Chemical Industry, said at a press conference in Tokyo that the project agreed to some two weeks ago is expected to produce 100,000 tons of polyethylene and polystyrene annually in addition to other plastic products.

Occidental Petroleum Corp. of the United States will serve as the prime contractor and Montedison S.P.A. of Italy as a subcontractor, Rudnev said.

Marubeni is the first Japanese company to participate in such a project in the Soviet Union, he added.

Rudnev, who is heading a Soviet delegation here to promote bilateral chemical products trade, said the Soviets hope more Japanese firms will join in future projects to develop eastern Siberia and foster mutual economic growth in the East Asian region.

He said he is pleased that Soyuzkhimexport's trade contracts with Japan has already reached 205 million rubles (430.5 billion yen) so far this year, adding he expects this year's figure to surpass 260 million rubles (546 billion yen) recorded in 1987 and 130 million rubles (273 billion yen) in 1986.

But he said chemical products trade with Japan has been mainly one-way, with Soviet purchases of Japanese goods 12 times greater than its sales to Japan.

"This imbalance in chemical products trade should be changed," he added.

Condolences on Death of DPRK's Yim Chun-chu
PM0305130488 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 88 Morning Edition p 2

[Message of condolences from CPSU Central Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on death of Yim Chun-chu]

[Text] To the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] Central Committee and the DPRK Central People's Committee.

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium express sincere condolences with the WPK Central Committee and the DPRK Central People's Committee on the death of Comrade Yim Chun-chu, member of the WPK Central Committee Politburo and vice president of the DPRK.

The whole of Comrade Yim Chun-chu's life was inextricably linked with the Korean people's struggle for the liberation of Korea from the Japanese colonialists and the building of socialism on Korean soil.

People in the Soviet Union knew Comrade Yim Chun-chu as a committed internationalist who devoted great efforts to strengthening friendship between the Korean and Soviet peoples.

Please convey our condolences to the family and friends of the deceased.

The CPSU Central Committee

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium

Shevardnadze Luncheon for DPRK's Kim Yong-nam
SK0105084088 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0825 GMT 1 May 88

[Text] Moscow April 29 (KCNA)—Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, gave a luncheon in Moscow on April 29 in honour of Kim Yong-nam, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, vice-premier of the Administration Council and minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK, on an official goodwill visit to the USSR.

Shevardnadze said in his speech: Soviet-Korean friendship is a constant and invariable value. The meeting between Comrade M.S. Gorbachev and Comrade Kim Il-song in October 1986 gave an important impetus to this process.

Touching upon the situation on the Korean peninsula where the seat of tension is keeping on, he pointed out:

It is essential in general to do away with the show of strength through the Korean peninsula as the DPRK suggests. Just like our Korean friends, we consider it the principal aim for the Korean peninsula to eliminate the military and political confrontation. This would be precisely the result of the implementatiom of the idea of making the peninsula a nuclear-free zone. The DPRK has already virtually declared its territory to be a nuclear-free zone. Next step is now up to Seoul and Washington, i.e. to remove U.S. nuclear arsenal from South Korea. If this happens—and we persistently suggest that the Americans do so—the Soviet Union would be ready together with the other nuclear powers to guarantee a nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula.

Another proposal of the DPRK for reducing armies and arms of the North and the South by stages, cutting their military strength respectively to 100,000 men by 1992 and, at the same time, withdrawing the U.S. troops will contribute to easing the tensions.

It is believed in the Soviet Union, he said, that it is necessary to establish a constructive inter-Korean dialogue the aim of which would be to achieve Korea's reunification on a peaceful democratic basis without any interference from the outside.

To this end, he said, it is necessary to convene a dialogue.

He referred to the need to convene a North-South joint conference proposed by the DPRK Government.

Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam said in his speech that the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries have developed more rapidly since the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song had a historical meeting with respected Comrade M.S. Gorbachev.

We express full support and solidarity for the peace initiatives and steps taken by the Soviet party and government, Kim Yong-nam said, and continued:

The treaty on eliminating part of nuclear weapons signed by the USSR and the the United States is a starting point of importance in the movement of detente and in the movement of nuclear disarmament.

The United States persistently sticks to the regional matters to which it is not directly related, while continuing to evade the solution of matters it is directly responsible for.

We, Kim Yong-nam said, consider that the U.S. imperialists cannot evade the responsiblity for the solution of the Korean problem caused by their occupation of South Korea.

Imperialists are now scheming to maintain the hotbed of war by allied forces, and for the present, are making crafty attempts to attain the purpose of "cross recognition," he stated, and continued:

We are convinced that the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries will as ever extend positive support and solidarity for the Korean people in their just cause of the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

It is the immovable stand of our party and the Government of the DPRK to constantly strengthen and develop the Korean-Soviet friendship.

The Korean people will in the future, too, make every possible effort to comprehensively expand and develop in depth the friendly and cooperative relations between two countries.

DPRK Delegation Stops Over in Moscow

LD0305191788 Moscow TASS in English 1903 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—A delegation of the DPRK led by member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, Vice-President of the DPRK Yi Chong-ok has stopped over in Moscow on the way home from Zambia.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Reportage on Gilashvili Southeast Asia Tour

Meets Philippine Officials

PM0305100688 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 88 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Interparliamentary Ties"]

[Text] Manila, 30 Apr—The visit to the Philippines by a group of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies headed by P.G. Gilashvili, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, has ended.

During their stay in Manila, the Soviet parliamentarians had meetings with leaders of the Philippine Congress and representatives of the country's government. In the course of conversations with Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and deputies of both chambers of Congress, a wide range of questions were discussed concerning the international situation and the Soviet Union's efforts to strengthen peace and security in the Asian and Pacific region.

The sides examined the potential for the further development of bilateral relations, including Soviet-Philippine interparliamentary ties. The Philippine legislators confirmed with satisfaction their acceptance of the USSR Supreme Soviet's invitation to visit the Soviet Union this year.

The Soviet delegation left Manila today.

More on Indonesian Talks

LD0305170088 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Jakarta May 3 TASS—A group of deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, led by Pavel Gilashvili, vice-president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, now on a visit here, had a meeting with Indonesia's Vice-President Sudharmono today. In the course of the meeting the vice-president underlined the need for strengthening mutual understanding and cooperation between nations, overcoming suspiciousness and distrust. The Soviet-American INF Treaty is of positive significance in this respect. It is necessary to continue advancing in the same direction, said Sudharmono, expressing the hope that the Soviet-American treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive armaments will be signed during the U.S. President's visit to Moscow.

Indonesia's active and dependent foreign policy course provides for the development of friendly relations with all countries, irrespective of their socio-political system on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, non-interference in each other's affairs and mutually beneficial cooperation. Indonesia intends to develop and

strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union on these principles. Both sides pointed to vast reserves existing in different areas of cooperation.

Lukyanov Notes U.S. Displeased by Philippines
OW0205134088 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2215 GMT 27 Apr 88

[Ye. Lukyanov commentary; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] According to the U.S. State Department, Washington has expressed its displeasure to the Philippines over this country's intention to ban any presence of nuclear weapons on its territory. Here is our commentary:

[Lukyanov] Hello, comrades. This reaction of the Washington administration followed the parliamentary debate, now under way in Manila, of a draft law banning the presence of nuclear weapons at two major U.S. bases in the Philippines—Clark Field and Subic Bay—as well as port calls by ships carrying such weapons.

This draft law, according to a U.S. State Department representative, is incompatible with U.S. policy on this issue. Its essence lies in concealing facts about the presence of nuclear arms on U.S. combat aircraft and ships. This position of Washington cannot be viewed in isolation from the U.S.-Philippines talks on the Pentagon bases in the Philippines that have been going on in Manila for almost a month. This country's leadership, as well as broad levels of the population, do not share the U.S. Administration's opinion that U.S. military facilities on Philippine territory are an important element in Asian stability.

The antinuclear law being debated in the Philippine parliament, aimed at normalizing the situation in the region, appears to be causing additional concern in Washington. And there are reasons for this. How can we forget the irritation of the White House over the New Zealand decision to ban port entry to ships with nuclear weapons, and the more recent obvious displeasure of the United States and some of its other NATO allies over a resolution adopted by the Danish Folketing demanding that written notice be given to commanders of warships entering Danish ports, that the presence of nuclear weapons on the country's territory is prohibited?

The growing alarm and fears of many countries linked with the United States in the military sphere of being drawn into one or another conflict have a very firm foundation. For example, according to the testimony of a former U.S. naval officer, James Bush, 80 percent of U.S. warships carry nuclear weapons. It is only natural, therefore, that in recent years more and more countries and regions have been actively joining in the struggle for nuclear-free status.

Razumovskiy Visits Vietnamese Enterprises
PM0305134788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 88 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "CPSU Delegation's Stay"]

[Text] Ho Chi Minh City, 28 Apr—The CPSU delegation headed by G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is continuing its stay in Vietnam.

Today the Soviet guests made a trip to the Vung Tau-Con Dao district. They made a stop in Dong Nai Province, where the "Long Thanh" Rubber-Growing Farm—a Vietnamese-Soviet economic cooperation project—is being created, and familiarized themselves with the progress in fulfilling the Ghe Vey targeted program. The USSR gives Vietnam technical assistance in laying out large plantations on terms of the subsequent delivery of natural rubber to our country.

In Vung Tau City, the CPSU delegation had a meeting with the district party leadership. The "Vietsovpetro" joint Vietnamese-Soviet enterprise was set up there in 1982 to prospect for and extract oil and gas on the continental shelf off the south of the SRV. Their industrial extraction has already been arranged. The Vietnamese friends shared their plans for the district's further socioeconomic development and for turning it into the center of the republic's oil- and gas-extracting industry.

The CPSU delegation visited the joint enterprise's shore base and port and had talks with Vietnamese and Soviet oilmen and construction workers.

Near East & South Asia

Afghanistan's Najibullah Departs for India
LD0405053288 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0525 GMT 4 May 88

[Text] Kabul, 4 May (TASS)—Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan, left today for the Republic of India on an official friendly visit. This has become known from official sources.

Najibullah Meets Afghan Private Entrepreneurs
LD0305140188 Moscow TASS in English 1224 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Kabul May 3 TASS—Afghan President Najibullah has met here with private enterpreneurs and traders, urging them to broaden cooperation between the private economic sector and the government.

He promised that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanstan and the Government would, for their part, do everything possible towards that end.

Najibullah said also that a national conference of Afghan traders would be held soon and that it would be attended by representatives of foreign companies as well.

Mironenko Presents Awards in Afghanistan
LD0305193488 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 3 May 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Soviet servicemen in Afghanistan are preparing to leave for home. Here is a report by our correspondent A. Petrova:

[Petrova] Regular life of a regular army unit, with its established daily routine; if no one shot today at our sentry posts and garrisons, if there were no mines on the roads, and, therefore, constant combat readiness. [sentence as heard] [video shows rooftop view of a garrison in the mountains, then cuts to exhibits in the regimental museum]

The museum of this unit, like that of any other unit, has everything related to its combat path in the past, but most of its exhibits relate to today. There are photographs of heroes, both dead and alive. This very regiment, positioned in the southeast of Afghanistan, will be one of the first to embark on the long road. Many of our servicemen have been awarded combat orders and medals for their service in Afghanistan for the flawless performance of their internationalist duty. Others have been nominated, but will in all probability receive them only when they are back home. [video shows formation of servicemen and Mironenko, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, presenting awards]

These decorations for combat valor and rolls of honor issued by the Komsomol Central Committee will, for the time being, probably be their only awards for Afghanistan for some of the young men. Viktor Ivanovich Mironenko, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, arrived in Afghanistan in order to learn everything about them from first-hand experience, to have a look, to talk to the Komsomol members in remote garrisons. They are soon to go home, after all.

[Begin Mironenko recording] There are many issues at hand; I shall not be able to list them all. What is involved is finding jobs for them, their homecoming, and taking care of the boys. [end recording]

Orlov Delegation Returns From Afghanistan
PM0305135788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 88 Second Edition p6

[TASS report: "Return Home"]

[Text] Kabul, 28 Apr—The USSR delegation headed by V.P. Orlov, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which participated in the celebrations for the 10th anniversary of the April revolution, left for home today. The delegation was seen off at Kabul Airport by H. Mas'ud, member of the Politburo and secretary of the PDPA Central Committee; S. La'eq, member of the PDPA Central Committee Politburo; and other officials.

At the airport in Moscow the delegation was met by A.F. Ryuytel, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; other officials; and M.S. Safi', Afghan ambassador to the USSR.

Primakov, U.S. Analysts Discuss Afghanistan
PM0405084988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 88 Morning Edition p 6

[B. Ivanov and V. Mikheyev account of discussion with Academician Ye.M. Primakov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute; Gorman Mattison, executive director of the International Center for Development Policy; and John Reuther, member of the International Center for Development Policy leadership, in Moscow: "Afghanistan: National Reconciliation and the Geneva Accords"; date of discussion not given—first four paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The U.S. Department of State persistently recommended for them not to travel to Afghanistan. Since they would not heed this warning and were determined to embark upon this risky venture, one official privately advised them to wear on their coat lapels a badge depicting the U.S. flag, so as to avoid accidental confusion in case they got in any trouble. There is obviously no need to explain who was not to confuse them with whom....

A staffer of the military department spoke even more frankly: The Stinger missiles were to be feared above all else. Let us recall that these are the missiles which Washington itself delivers to the armed opposition groupings.

These "parting words" were described to us by Gorman Mattison, executive director of the International Center for Development Policy, and John Reuther, member of this organization's leadership, who have just returned from Kabul, where they participated in a conference held under the slogan "Peaceful Ways To Settle the Afghan Problem."

That was a three-way dialogue which brought together Afghan, U.S., and Soviet scientists, politicians, and public figures. The Soviet delegation was headed by Academician Ye.M. Primakov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Institute, in whose office our improvised "roundtable discussion" took place.

IZVESTIYA: The national reconciliation policy in Afghanistan has already made it possible for many refugees to return to their home areas from abroad and

helped people who until only yesterday blindly believed that everything could be resolved only by the force of arms to perceive another way out of this protracted conflict. The Geneva accords are creating the ground for extinguishing the fire of tension in the very heart of Asia. Is this sufficient to finally take the "Afghan question" off the agenda?

Ye.M. Primakov: The main point lies in the interaction of the two factors you mentioned. National reconciliation in Afghanistan as a way toward stabilization of the domestic situation, and the Geneva agreement, which creates the most favorable external conditions for this. It is the first agreement to define in detail conditions guaranteeing the cessation of outside interference. These two elements are closely interconnected. On the one hand, the Geneva accords would have been impossible without the national reconciliation policy, while on the other hand, the agreement reached at the talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan must give an impetus to this process.

We discussed in detail these aspects of the settlement, and we can see that Afghanistan's leadership wishes to form a coalition government. In this context, the U.S. side at the conference raised this question: Could Zahir Shah not help this work in some way? The Afghans did not turn down the possibility of his participation in this process. One of the Afghan participants in the conference said that contacts between President Najibullah and Zahir Shah could take place at any time and in any convenient place.

At the same time, the U.S. side drew attention to the settlement formula put forward by President Ziaul Haq of Pakistan. He proposed that a Loya Jirgah be convened with Zahir Shah's participation, to bring together three forces: The present leadership headed by Najibullah, the Peshawar "Seven," and the refugees. In reply to this, many Afghans remarked that the refugees' plenipotentiary representatives could easily be chosen from among people close to the opposition "Alliance of Seven" and directly dependent on them.

Briefly speaking, the discussion revolved around acceptable formulas for an internal settlement in Afghanistan.

J. Reuther: I think that sentiments in favor of a military victory by the opposition groupings have emerged in the United States now that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan has been scheduled. In my view, it is very dangerous to encourage such sentiments. We met with Afghans from different sides of the firing line, and we sensed that they all are tired of war. And if some of them hope that they will manage to gain the upper hand by military means, they would not be inclined to make compromises. I believe that the U.S. Congress and the forces which could influence U.S. public opinion must seriously study the problems which Afghanistan now encounters. No attempts must be made to solve them by force of arms.

G. Mattison: It is appropriate to recall that U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and U.S. support for the mujahidin—all this was done in secret. Even though last year the United States is believed to have spent approximately $630 million on aid to the mujahidin, this subsidy was never the subject of debate in Congress. In such a case, the public becomes unreceptive to the arguments put forth by the administration in favor of the provision of secret aid. I believe that the Soviet Union, where all aspects of this problem are now publicly discussed, has caught up with us and overtaken us in this context. We have to make up the omissions in this regard. Thus, one of the important results of our trip to Afghanistan is the fact that now we, 13 Americans not counting the journalists who accompanied us, are in a position to raise doubts—more authoritatively and on the basis of our own experience—about the sense of the policy pursued by the U.S. Administration in that part of the world.

IZVESTIYA: In this context one might ask: What at present is the specific obstacle to progress along the path of a settlement in Afghanistan?

Ye.M. Primakov: I would single out three basic aspects. First, the stance taken by the Peshawar "Alliance", which rejects outright the Geneva accords and the call to end the war, banking on the war's continuation. Naturally, there is no unity of views within the opposition, and this is now noticeably manifest. But we are talking about the "Alliance of Seven" as a whole, which refuses cooperation with Afghanistan's leadership. We should not overlook another factor: The alliance is based on Pakistani territory and this could serve as a factor of pressure on that country's policy, encouraging it to breach the concluded accords.

The second factor is the possibility of continuing arms deliveries to opposition groupings by the United States. We are not even talking about the fact that this could alter the correlation of forces. In some people's opinion, the U.S. arms delivered there are already sufficient for 3 years of war. We are talking about something else: These deliveries through Pakistani territory will undermine the agreements reached in Geneva. The Soviet Government statement published 27 April says: "Any retreat from the enshrined accords could harm the cause of an Afghan settlement and stain the moral prestige of a state breaching a pledge undertaken before the whole world."

And third, the refugee problem. Nobody is discounting the moral and psychological aspects of this problem. Some people are not returning to Afghanistan because they are afraid. There is still no stability in the country. This evidently has its effect. But we cannot pass over in silence the fact that there are certain forces preventing the refugees from returning home. Some people would like to use them as levers for exerting pressure. We were told at the conference that these forces are not only physically hindering a return but are also resorting to

other tricks. For example, they are freezing Afghan refugees' accounts in Pakistani banks. This is primarily the work of the "implacable opposition" based in Peshawar.

Let us examine the problem from all angles. It is well known that Najibullah's government is not in control of the entire territory of Afghanistan. But refugees are not returning even to areas where there are no representatives of the Kabul authorities. They used to say that the presence of Soviet soldiers was an obstacle. But there are no Soviet troops in 12 of the 30 provinces. This is by no means a simple problem. But if the refugees are still held back by force, intimidated, or prevented from returning home, this will create further instability.

G. Mattison: We clearly perceived that Afghanistan's leadership wants to form a coalition government and wishes to end the war. This was in great contrast with the impression we got from our Washington meetings with the mujahidin. There were no supporters of the idea of reconciliation among them. In all likelihood, when we return to the United States we will have to lay the stress on a careful study of who is who among the opposition and on identifying moderate forces which are willing and ready to embark on reconciliation.

One more remark. The political settlement is gathering speed in Afghanistan. We were sincerely amazed by the calm reigning in Kabul. We saw no Soviet soldiers in the capital's streets, only Afghan servicemen. On arrival in the area of Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan's largest religious center, we saw peasants cultivating the fields and enterprises at work. We met traders and businessmen. As a matter of fact, we found ourselves in a rather curious position. A group of Americans and Soviet Communists were trying to teach business to people who have been in business for 3,000 years already.... At the bazaar, one merchant advised us not to worry about what to do with a carpet we bought: Leave some money behind, he said, and your address, and since my twin brother is in "business" in New York, we will forward the carpet to your home. Therefore, Afghanistan is not a country where a settlement is impossible. Rather, many of those whom we met in Washington are "impossible" people. But people inside Afghanistan are talking to each other....

IZVESTIYA: Prognosis in politics is a delicate matter. Nevertheless, what are the emerging prospects for the immediate future?

Ye.M. Primakov: The policy of national reconciliation, as the Afghan leaders themselves note, has gone through several stages. Following a conversation with President Najibullah, I am even more convinced that the Afghan Government is committed to this course and will consistently pursue it. It is up to the others, to its opponents. National reconciliation points to the creation of a neutral, independent, and nonaligned Afghanistan. There is no question of Afghanistan being closer to us in its social system. Or closer to us in its ideology. Let the Afghan people themselves decide this. At the same time, we are interested in ensuring that Afghanistan is not a hostile but a friendly state in relations with us. We share a frontier stretching for over 2,500 km. Let me recall that we had very good relations with Afghanistan under both Zahir Shah and Daoud. But all this, I repeat, has nothing to do with similarity or connections in ideology and the social system.

G. Mattison: We spent a long time talking with Sulayman La'eq, president of the Afghan Academy of Sciences. Our delegation included representatives of private organizations dealing with the provision of aid. This was perhaps an important feature of the conference—for the first time in 10 years, during which our states had virtually no normal relations, close and direct contacts were established between Afghans and Americans. I am convinced that many voluntary societies and organizations in the United States are prepared to help the Afghan people together with their Soviet colleagues. How, specifically? In rebuilding schools, in humanitarian aid to refugees, in caring for Afghan children. As a matter of fact, the conference turned into a joint initiative capable of serving as a model also in other "hot spots" on the planet.

Ye.M. Primakov: I think that economic aid will be highly important for Afghanistan's future. We are prepared to develop trade and economic relations on a bilateral basis. We would welcome aid to Afghanistan from the United States. It seems to me that an obvious benefit could be produced by multilateral cooperation in this noble work within the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations.

J. Reuther: Turning back to the conference held in Kabul, I would like to say that this is a remarkable precedent for multilateral dialogue on questions of solving regional conflicts. Its participants unambiguously advocated a political settlement as opposed to military methods for solving such disputes. I think that, as the Soviet leader correctly noted, the solution of the Afghan problem could become a model for the settlement of other international conflicts.

Ye.M. Primakov: I think that we can end our conversation today on this note of optimism.

Iranian, Rebel Afghan Accord Stances Viewed

OW0405003988 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 23 Apr 88

[Glazunov commentary]

[Text] It has been a week since the agreement on political settlement of the issues regarding Afghanistan was signed in Geneva. What is public reaction to it? Glazunov, a political observer at this station, has the following comments:

No one is indifferent to the settlement of the issues surrounding Afghanistan, and proof of this is that most of the worldwide responses to the agreement are positive. People have pointed out that the Geneva accord will serve to block foreign intervention, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will create such a possibility. They regard the constructive and concerted actions taken by the Soviet Union and the United States—the guarantors of the accord—as something of special significance. The accord has set a precedent for the settlement of other regional crises. The lesson of Afghanistan is important to all people. It is political means, not force, which can settle conflicts.

At the same time, I must point out that the guns have not yet become silent in Afghanistan. The Afghan opposition armed forces don't intend to stop using their guns in the future. The Geneva agreement helps relax the situation in Afghanistan and prevents foreign intervention, but it can do nothing about Afghanistan's internal confrontation. This is not an issue others can settle for the Afghan people. The Afghan people should reach an agreement among themselves on a truce, reconciliation, and establishment of a coalition government.

Will the relaxation of the situation in Afghanistan help its internal reconciliation? Of course it will. The Afghan Government constantly says that it will never permit external intervention, and the leaders of the opposition armed forces say that the presence of Soviet troops is the major problem. The Geneva accord will solve these two problems. In other words, it has created the necessary conditions for solving Afghanistan's internal problems. Facts show that force can solve nothing there because neither of the rival sides has sufficient strength. Such an experience is the result of a lot of bloodshed.

The Kabul Government has drawn a lesson from the bitter experience and put forward a plan for national reconciliation on a multi-party and multi-system basis. It is regrettable that the opposition armed forces have not drawn such a lesson. All the leaders of the seven-party alliance in Peshawar say that they are opposed to national reconciliation. They will continue fighting in order to monopolize political power. When the Geneva accord becomes valid and is enforced, it is likely that the Peshawar seven-party alliance will no longer be permitted to operate in Pakistan.

Then what does the opposition expect to rely on? Maybe they hope that they can rely on Iran. Iran is the only country opposed to the Geneva accord. The seven-party alliance probably has been encouraged by an arms supply promise.

I hope that the agreement on noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs will be strictly honored, and Iran will not make a final decision. I think that restoration of peace in Afghanistan conforms to the interests of all its neighbors, as well as the interests of the Afghan people, who are victims of internal strife.

Admiral Sorokin Holds Talks in Syria

JN040656 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 2015 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] General Mustafa Talas, deputy commander in chief of the Army and the Armed Forces, deputy prime minister, and defense minister, received Admiral Sorokin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and his delegation at his office today. The Soviet military attache in Damascus attended the meeting. The talks dealt with cooperation and friendship among the two friendly armies and countries, and ways to promote them.

Admiral Sorokin arrived in Damascus yesterday on a visit to Syria that will last several days. He visited the martyrs' cemetery in Najha, laid a wreath of flowers at the martyr monument, and wrote the following statement in the visitors book: The people in our country are fully aware of the war. They highly appreciate the Syrian people's heroic steadfastness in defending their homeland.

The guest delegation also visited the liberated city of Al-Qunaytirah. Admiral Sorokin described his impressions. He said: Al-Qunaytirah is a live witness to the brutality of the Israeli aggressors because the Zionists are the inheritors of fascism and Nazism. He added: Al-Qunaytirah is a symbol of the manhood, steadfastness, and heroism of the Syrian people and their Armed Forces.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Brutents Departs for Ethiopia Visit 2 May

PM0305135188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 May 88 Second Edition p4

[TASS report: "Ties Develop"]

[Text] K.N. Brutents, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, left for Addis Ababa 2 May at the invitation of the Workers Party of Ethiopia Central Committee.

Dobrynin Receives Tanzanian Party Delegation

PM0305122988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Conversation at CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] On 30 April, A.F. Dobrynin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received a delegation from the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM) headed by D. Mwakawago, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CCM National Executive Committee, which is visiting the USSR.

The delegation heard a report on the CPSU's activity in implementing the 27th party congress decisions and on the deepening of the process of the revolutionary restructuring of all aspects of Soviet society's life. D. Mwakawago described the socioeconomic and political tasks which the CCM is resolving, guided by the program documents adopted by its third congress.

There was a discussion of some questions of cooperation between the USSR and Tanzania and it was noted with satisfaction that the sides' positions are close on the topical problems of the struggle for peace and international security and against imperialism, colonialism, and racism.

Ghanaian Delegation Visits USSR 19 Apr-2 May

PM0305135388 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 May 88 Second Edition p4

[TASS report: "Delegation's Stay"]

[Text] A delegation from Ghana's Provisional National Defense Council [PNDC] headed by Alhadj Mahama Idrissu, member of the PNDC, was in the Soviet Union 19 April through 2 May. The delegation had meetings and talks at the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work and International Departments and the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Institute, and familiarized itself with the activity of the Moscow and Lvov oblast soviets.

The delegation members noted the great international importance of Soviet experience in the revolutionary restructuring of all spheres of social life, democratization, and glasnost.

East Europe

Gromyko To Visit Romania Second Half of May

LD0305172388 Moscow TASS in English 1704 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—Andrey Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, will pay an official friendly visit to the Socialist Republic of Romania in the second ten days of May.

Gromyko will visit that country at the invitation of Nicolae Ceausescu, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party and president of Romania.

Western Media 'Ballyhoo' at PPR Strikes Noted

LD0305230188 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Now we bring to you a report by Vasiliy Lesovik from Warsaw. In recent days, a propaganda ballyhoo, unprecedented these past few years, has been raised around Poland by Western media. The cause for this was that in the last days of April, work was halted in a number of workshops of the Nowa Huta metallurgical combine near Krakow. Here is what Vasiliy Lesovik reports from Warsaw:

[Lesovik] Those taking part in the strike demanded of the directorship a 50-percent increase in wages. Immediately, various underground groups sought to make use of such high and economically unjustified demands—which, incidentally, are not supported by workers in other workshops—seeking to lend a political hue to them.

Instigators appeared at the combine who neither have nor had anything to do with the combine and its collective. There also have been attempts to induce a wave of strikes at other enterprises, particularly at the Stalowa Wola combine and the Gdansk shipyard.

Similarly inspired actions provoke the law and the anxiety of the Polish public. As the newspaper TRYBUNA LUDU wrote on this score: Emotions have outgrown the boundary of law, democracy, and economic thinking. Demands to increase wages independent of economic results are nothing more than an attempt to put the economy of the country and the concept of reform into a breakdown situation, an attempt to block reform.

This whole campaign is more reminiscent, not so much of an economic demand and the striving to reach an understanding, but of well-rehearsed blackmail with political overtones.

I have already said at the outset that my professional colleagues from the Western media accredited in Warsaw are doing their utmost to fish in troubled waters. For example, their reports on the 1 May demonstrations in the country were of the nature of battlefield reports, although there was no battlefield. The 1 May demonstrations were in no way different in character or mass nature from the demonstrations of past years.

There is no doubt that there has been an attempt to effect a strike on the economy of the country at the start of its progress along the firm path of reform and the democratization of life.

An old method has been adopted: Use the working class for purposes which have nothing in common with its interests. The Polish working class well remembers the kind of dramatic consequences this had for the country as a whole and for each of its citizens individually at the start of the 1980's. On this account, it has both experience and acquired wisdom.

Briefs

GDR Youth Delegation

Moscow, 2 May (ADN)—An FDJ delegation led by Eberhard Aurich, first secretary of the Central Council, arrived in Moscow today for a friendship visit. They have been invited by the Komsomol. In talks with the guests from the GDR, Viktor Mironenko, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, reported on the organization's work on fulfilling the resolutions of the 20th Komsomol Congress. Eberhard Aurich reported on the achievements of the GDR's young people in the "FDJ Pledge GDR 40." This afternoon the delegation visited the Leninist Komsomol's College, at which young people from numerous countries study. During this visit Eberhard Aurich met with students delegated by the FDJ. [Text] [*LD030022 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1326 GMT 2 May 88*]

West Europe

Patsyuk Views NATO Pressures on Denmark

LD0305122788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 3 May 88

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Text] NATO leaders are continuing to exert pressure on Denmark, whose parliament pointed out on the Thursday before last the incompatibility of visits by ships carrying nuclear weapons at the country's ports and the principles of national security. In an interview for THE TIMES of London, U.S. Defense Secretary Carlucci again warned that this decision might have very serious consequences for NATO, and even have a negative influence on Soviet-U.S. talks about reducing strategic offensive weapons. We do not intend to interfere in internal affairs, but NATO membership brings with it not only privileges but also obligations, the secretary said, hinting that Washington would not leave this decision without consequences. Carlucci's statement is one among many to be heard concerning the Danes at the moment. Here is commentator Vladimir Pasko:

The NATO leadership is undertaking really feverish efforts to ensure that the document adopted by the Danish legislators remains only on paper. Great Britain has called off visits by its warships, and together with Washington, London has made statements about a possible reduction of the bloc's naval exercises in Danish territorial waters, thus casting doubt on bilateral defense agreements. As you will recall, this was followed by the demostrative moving of a session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group from Denmark, while Lord Carrington, the retiring NATO general secretary, cancelled a farewell visit to Copenhagen. Things have now reached a stage where Denmark is being accused of inflicting damage on the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. True, it is not clear how the U.S. defense secretary connects these talks with issues that concern purely Danish sovereignty.

But one cannot fail to see something else—the fact that this campaign of pressure and blackmail is being waged at a time when early parliamentary elections are planned in Denmark. By intimidating the Danes, the Atlanticists are trying to consolidate the position of the current four-party cabinet in Denmark. They are evidently disturbed by the ruling coalition's loss of a number of parliamentary seats at the last election, at a time when NATO policy is not finding support in the country. They are even more alarmed by the fact that the Danish attitude to NATO's course which has come to light could bring on a chain reaction of anti-nuclear decisions in other countries of the bloc. This fact was, incidentally, noted by the Danish newspaper POLITIKEN.

The attitude of the Europeans to the Atlanticists' strategy of nuclear deterrence, particularly following the INF Treaty, is quite definite. The main emphasis in NATO's complaints about Denmark is that the latter is, so they say, undermining alliance obligations, although it must be noted that the parliament's decision has merely reaffirmed Denmark's antinuclear status, which is continually ignored by its partners in the alliance. U.S. naval missile-carriers use Danish ports as their base. But everything currently being said and written in the NATO capitals cannot conceal something else: the reluctance of NATO strategists to see the world situation as it is. They continue to view the problem of ensuring Europe's security through the prism of the strategy of nuclear deterrence, a strategy which has long since not ensured but undermined security.

Nuclear Parley 'Eloquent'

PM0405091588 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Sychev dispatch: "Denmark—Eloquent Dialogue"]

[Text] Stockholm—The Folketing resolution of 14 April, which makes it obligatory to inform captains of warships entering Denmark's ports that they do not have the right to carry nuclear weapons, has caused a government crisis.

NATO allies, above all the United States and Britain, have mounted a pressure campaign against Copenhagen in an attempt to set public opinion against the parliament's decision. In its turn Denmark's bourgeois government has refused to submit to the Folketing and has announced early elections. One of the main arguments put forward by representatives of the ruling cabinet is that NATO countries have been informed of Denmark's position and there are no grounds for fearing that someone is ignoring the principles of its non-nuclear policy. Heated arguments have also raged around this. Two interviews are of interest in this connection.

In the first interview, James Bush, former commander of a U.S. Navy nuclear submarine, answers a television commentator's questions:

"Any ship with nuclear weapons won't give them up when visiting a Danish port. According to my information, 80 percent of U.S. Navy ships carry nuclear weapons. I cannot say absolutely precisely whether a particular ship carries such weapons, but if it does, then it won't leave them on land when it moves into Danish waters."

"But the Danish Government, in response to questions from Folketing deputies, affirms: There are no grounds for supposing that U.S. ships have visited Danish ports with nuclear weapons on board."

"I believe that your government has shut its eyes to this. If it really wants to know whether there are nuclear weapons on U.S. ships when they dock at Danish moorings, it could obtain that information."

In the second interview, Danish Prime Minister Poul Schluter comments, at the request of a BERLINGSKE TIDENDE correspondent, on what James Bush has said:

"What can I add to what has been said by this former U.S. Navy captain, who, incidentally, takes an active part in the peace movement. I do not exclude the possibility of finding an officer who, on retiring, has decided to express an opinion at odds with the well-known facts. I would like you to look at the present situation from a different angle: Russian ships carrying nuclear weapons are near Danish shores, but we forbid our allies to carry such weapons. We do not want to agree to NATO and U.S. ships which may, possibly, be carrying nuclear weapons docking in our ports."

"But you said that they aren't carrying nuclear weapons?"

"No, no, of course they aren't. You're right."

What can you say? What eloquent dialogue.

Spain Policy on Nuclear-Armed Port Calls Marked

PM0405122588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 88 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent V. Chernyshev dispatch: "With Nuclear Baggage? U.S. Navy Ships and Submarines Have Chosen the Spanish City of Palma on the Island of Majorca"]

[Text] Madrid, April—U.S. warships and submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons on board put into the port of Palma 43 times last year alone. In all, they spent 286 days in the Spanish port. In short, the presence of menacing hulks in the bay has now become an almost everyday picture.

But are nuclear weapons really on board? Nobody knows. "U.S. naval officials," the Madrid magazine EL GLOBO remarks in this connection, "abide by the policy: 'Don't confirm; don't deny.' The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also do not confirm, but neither do they refute the exposures being made. The civilian authorities have no information about the military nature and types of weapons on the ships which put into the port." Moreover, as the magazine attests, the city's mayor does not even always know about the arrival of guests and sometimes encounters them only at some official reception.

N. Barcelo, a specialist in nuclear matters and one of the antiwar movement leaders in Majorca, believes it absurd to think that U.S. ships are roaming about the seas and oceans "empty." "Their might and their destructive strategy are founded precisely on nuclear weapons," N. Barcelo says, "and it is unlikely that these would be left in bases, particularly when it is a question of such a critical zone as the Mediterranean." On the very day when the ecologists' leaders asked the local authorities to begin drawing up "plans for an emergency nuclear situation," such as exist in provinces where there are nuclear power stations, on that very day, the autonomous government of the Balearic Islands reported the start of work by "a laboratory fitted with the most sophisticated equipment" to measure the radiation level on the archipelago. Why, the press puts the question, would such a laboratory be needed in Majorca, this well-known resort center, if the authorities were firmly confident that "guests come unarmed"?

Spain's antiwar and pacifist organizations have repeatedly pointed out that visits to the country's ports by U.S. ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons on board contradict the assertion advanced by the Spanish Government as a condition of NATO membership, when a general referendum was being held on this question. That point states: "The ban on the siting, storage, and importation of nuclear weapons into Spain will persist." A Defense Ministry spokesman replied to a question from the magazine EL GLOBO: "There is no contradiction with the referendum's conditions. Foreign ships put into Spanish ports and moor there in accordance with criteria laid down by the government." In short, they may pass through but not be imported. This is why the authorities persistently emphasize that the guests are in Spain "in transit"—like transit passengers, almost like the foreign tourists who fill the islands in their hundreds of thousands.

It is thought here that the number of visits by U.S. warships will continue to grow. After Spain joined NATO, the Balearic Islands became a convenient strategic point on the way from the U.S. base at Rota (Cadiz Province) to Naples, where the headquarters of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean is situated.

Bovin Reviews First Round of French Elections

PM0305145988 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 May 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Aleksandr Bovin "Political Observer's Opinion": "French Elections: Second Round Coming Up"]

[Text] French political life is abuzz with preparations for round two of the presidential elections, which is due to take place on 8 May. The competitors are the winners of round one—President F. Mitterrand, representing the country's left flank, and Prime Minister J. Chirac, the right-wing candidate. To get an idea of the distribution of political forces in France, it is useful to scrutinize the results of round one.

The sensational success belonged to J.-M. Le Pen, leader of the extreme right-wing "National Front" group. He obtained 14.38 percent of the vote. Le Pen himself called the result a "political earthquake." We have achieved, he said, a "fundamental alteration in the political map. From this moment on, nothing will be able to be done in France without the 'National Front' voters." Let us hope the French have the common sense to stop Le Pen and his confederates. But meanwhile—meanwhile, his "ultrasimple" program (down with "foreigners") has particularly active support in industrial areas and in the suburbs of big cities, where there are many foreign workers and unemployed French people. For example, in Marseilles, Le Pen gained more votes than J. Chirac and R. Barre put together.

Le Pen's success is obviously due to the confusion among a section of the electorate in the face of the chronic economic mess and lack of confidence that the "traditional" political parties (Communists, Gaullists, Centrists) can radically change the situation.

The defection of voters to Le Pen weakened the "non-extreme" right wing. J. Chirac obtained 19.95 percent of the vote, and R. Barre obtained 16.53 percent. Compare this with the 1986 parliamentary elections at which the parties Chirac and Barre represent obtained 8 percent more. Why have these "percentages" changed their political sympathies? Most likely because when in power, in government, both the Rally for the Republic and the Union for French Democracy failed to keep their promises and to achieve steady economic growth; they were also unable to unravel the tight social knots.

Now for the left part of the political spectrum:

F. Mitterrand was well ahead of all the other candidates. He received 34.11 percent of the vote. Presumably the "presidential palace effect" played a part, as did a certain aura of stability and confidence with which Mitterrand is able to surround himself. Another factor was his ability to defend his positions and choose arguments, that is, that Cartesian clarity of thought of which the French are so proud.

The Communists suffered a major defeat. Their candidate, A. Lajoinie, obtained only 6.76 percent of the vote, approximately somewhat less than half the vote obtained by G. Marchais at the last presidential elections. The bourgeois press put this down to two factors. First, the fact that some of the voters who usually supported the Communists had been shocked by the Communists' participation in a socialist government. Second, the factor of "tactical voting": Since it is known in advance that the Communist will not win, why vote for him? It is better tactics to vote for someone who can go all the way. Certainly, both these factors are valid.

But it seems more serious to me. The Communists—and this applies not only to the French Communist Party—do not have a program. They do not have the slogans to entice the broad strata of the populace, above all, the working class. The Communists' strategy and tactics are clearly inadequate for the new conditions created by the restructuring of capitalism and its high degree of adaptability to the realities of the second half of the 20th centuryy. The negative processes and phenomena which were for a long time typical of our country have also been a factor in the diminished authority and influence of the Communists.

The French "Greens," who are for environmental conservation, abandonment of nuclear power, and elimination of nuclear weapons, can congratulate themselves on their success. Their candidate, A. Waechter, obtained 3.77 percent of the vote to the surprise of everyone, including himself. Three other left-wing presidential candidates together obtained 4.46 percent.

Thus, the right wing (including the extreme right wing and the Centrists) altogether obtained more than one-half the vote, 50.86 percent. The left wing altogether obtained 49.14 percent. The arithmetic is evidence that the distribution of political forces in France is little changed. However, the "Le Pen phenomenon," in my view, suggests an intensification of conservative sentiments. Of course, this does not mean that J. Chirac will win on 8 May. The majority of those who voted for Barre will now vote for Chirac. But, to win the presidency, he needs the "National Front" vote. There is a big danger here because an alliance (albeit not a formal one) with Le Pen would cause a considerable number of voters to migrate from Chirac to Mitterrand.

Effectively all the left-wing forces will vote for Mitterrand. The Communists have already announced their intention to do so, with the reservation that they will not be voting for Mitterrand's program but to block the right's path to power—reasonable enough.

The latest polls show that the current president may get between 53 and 57 percent of the vote. Most likely that is what will happen.

Further on Soviet-West German Security Session
PM021849 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Apr 88 First Edition p 5

[Captain M. Zheglov report: "For Stability in Europe"]

[Text] What must be done to ensure that the nuclear disarmament process initiated with the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in Washington is uninterrupted and does not become just a striking, but isolated episode in contemporary world development? Can the plans that NATO is putting forward today to modernize nuclear armaments bar the way to a nonnuclear and nonviolent world? These and other questions were the focus of attention at the traditional meeting between USSR and FRG public representatives on the theme of "Stability in Europe." The meeting was organized by the Soviet Committee For European Security and Cooperation and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FRG).

In the course of the discussion which took place, it was stressed that the future disarmament process demands active participation and support from every state, every political party and public organization. Present ideological differences between states with different sociopolitical systems must give way to commonality of interests—above all, security interests. West European countries can also make a considerable contribution to the cause of strengthening political and military stability in the world. Unfortunately, L. Tolkunov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, stressed in his speech at the meeting, Europe, once the cradle of international detente, has not been the reinitiator of disarmament. Politicians in a number of West European countries are still fighting shy of the new political thinking. Hence the opposition of certain Western circles to a "third nuclear zero" and plans to "compensate" for the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles to be eliminated under the Washington treaty. This policy does not conform with the interests of the peoples of either socialist or capitalist states. It undermines stability in Europe and blocks the normalization of relations among all European states, the speaker stressed.

Stability on the continent does not mean stagnation, V. Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, stated in the course of his speech. Stability means the constant development of the all-European process, which is oriented toward peace, security, and mutually advantageous cooperation. In talking about stability, we rely on definite principles reflected in CPSU documents. The first of these is the unconditional recognition of the diversity of our continent's countries and a positively tolerant attitude to that diversity. It is a reality that states belonging to different sociopolitical systems exist on European territory. We are firmly convinced that stability on the continent cannot be ensured unless recognition of this fact is guaranteed not only in words but also in action.

In this connection, the concept of the "all-European home" was broadly discussed at the meeting. It was stressed that peace can only be preserved in Europe by joint efforts, taking into consideration the interests of all states belonging to the different social systems and opposing military-political alliances.

Disarmament is a structure of paramount necessity in constructing an "all-European home." FRG Bundestag Deputies A. von Buelow and K. Voigt, in particular, indicated this. The opinion was expressed that European stability and security can only be strengthened by establishing balance in armed forces and conventional armaments at reduced levels, eliminating imbalances and asymmetries in troops and armaments, and removing the potential for a sudden offensive and large-scale offensive operations. Such steps as creation of nuclear-free zones and chemical weapons-free zones would help strengthen European security.

A special place at the meeting was devoted to the problem of Soviet-FRG relations. It was noted with satisfaction that positive changes have taken shape in USSR-FRG relations. This has been facilitated to a considerable extent by the FRG's position on certain disarmament problems. However, the level of these relations cannot satisfy both sides. The "enemy image" fostered by certain FRG circles greatly impedes further development of bilateral contacts. Unfortunately, the specific measures put forward by the Soviet Union to overcome such stereotypes do not always meet with understanding from the FRG.

In the course of the frank, businesslike exchange of opinions, it was stressed that further steps must be taken to strengthen confidence and stability on the European Continent.

Vorontsov Receives West German Ambassador 3 May
LD0305192488 Moscow TASS in English 1745 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov today received the West German ambassador to the Soviet Union, Andreas Meyer-Landrut, at his request.

They discussed topical international issues of mutual interest.

Vorontsov Holds Talks in Turkey 26-29 Apr
PM0305134188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 88 Morning Edition p4

[TASS report: "Mutual Interest"]

[Text] Ankara, 1 May—Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, who had a number of meetings with the representatives of the Turkish leadership and who also visited Istanbul, was in Turkey from 26-29

April. Yu.M. Vorontsov was received by and had thorough conversations with Turkish Prime Minister T. Ozal and Foreign Minister M. Yilmaz. Constructive talks were also held with N. Kandemir, Turkish first deputy foreign minister. In the course of these conversations, great attention was devoted to discussing fundamental questions linked with the present status and development of Soviet-Turkish relations and also topical international issues, including regional problems.

The exchange of opinions on questions of Soviet-Turkish relations confirmed both sides' firm intention to proceed to consistently develop them and build up the positive elements in the entire complex of these relations, including by galvanizing political contacts and further broadening them by using new forms and spheres of mutually beneficial trade and economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation. They pointed out the special significance of consolidating the contractual legal basis of Soviet-Turkish relations. Yu.M. Vorontsov and N. Kandemir signed a Soviet-Turkish consular convention.

While discussing international problems, Yu.M. Vorontsov informed the Turkish leaders about the main results of the latest round of talks held in Moscow on 21-24 April between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. In this connection, they stressed the great importance of progressing further along the path of new accords in the nuclear disarmament sphere started by the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which constitutes a specific example of the new political thinking in action.

A thorough exchange of opinions took place on a number of regional problems, including questions on the Persian Gulf situation and a Near East and Cyprus settlement. Yu.M. Vorontsov explained to the Turkish leadership the content and tremendous significance of the documents signed in Geneva on Afghanistan, which form an international legal basis for solving this regional conflict and thus open up the way to establishing long-awaited peace on Afghan soil. The Soviet side expressed satisfaction at the Turkish leadership's positive attitude to the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan, an attitude which regards them as a success on the road to finding a political solution to the Afghan problem. Both sides expressed the wish that all interested parties will observe the aforementioned agreements precisely and strictly and that the international community will do its utmost to facilitate this.

While analyzing the situation in the Persian Gulf region, the sides expressed concern at the escalation of tension in this region, especially recently. They stressed the need for a very speedy peace settlement to the Iran-Iraq armed conflict based on fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 598. The closeness of USSR and Turkish positions on the immediate cessation of the "war of the cities" and a ban on the use of chemical weapons was pointed out.

Regarding a Near East settlement, the sides advocated the need for the speediest convocation of an international conference on the Near East with a view to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of balancing the interests of all parties and ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

In the course of the conversations, an exchange of opinions took place on questions of a Cyprus settlement. The Turkish interlocutors were given confirmation of the Soviet Union's principled and constructive position on Cyprus, one of the elements of which is the holding of an international conference within a UN framework.

The conversations and talks in Ankara showed both sides' great mutual interest in actively developing Soviet-Turkish relations in order to boost them to a new and higher level of cooperation and good-neighborliness.

Italian PCI Women Activists Visit USSR

PM0305133788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 88 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Guests From Italy"]

[Text] Under the plan for party exchange between the CPSU and the Italian Communist Party [PCI], a delegation of PCI women activists headed by S. Dameri, member of the PCI Central Committee, visited the Soviet Union from 22-28 April.

The delegation visited Moscow and the Estonian SSR, had meetings and talks at the CPSU Central Committee International Department and the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, visited an industrial enterprise and a kolkhoz, and familiarized itself with the course of restructuring in the USSR, with its achievements and problems, and also with the working and leisure conditions of Soviet women.

A "roundtable" was held at the Soviet Women's Committee with the participation of the delegation of PCI women activists and representatives of the Soviet public.

Political & Social

Gas Works Failure Poisons Orenburg Residents

LD0305161088 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] A technological failure at a gas works in the city of Orenburg in the Ural Mountains has led to hydrogen sulphate poisoning of people in a nearby village. Nine persons, among them four children, were hospitalized. Another 42 residents display symptoms of light poisoning. The sanitary service has halted production and an investigation has been launched into the circumstances.

Further on Accident

LD0305202988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] I would like to draw your attention, comrades, to a subject which we have repeatedly—including this morning—dealt with in our broadcasts. The subject in question is the most alarming situation which has arisen in the airspace above the Orenburg gas complex. In today's "Morning Panorama" on the Mayak service our correspondent Pavel Rykov reported that in that region a significant proportion of so-called residual gases are still being discharged without any kind of purification—that is, about 100,000 tonnes of harmful substances per year. We shall now reproduce an excerpt from the report from Orenburg:

[Begin Rykov recording] On the eve of the festivities, one of these plumes covered the village of (Muzhichya-Palovka). This happened in the evening and the next day in the kolkhoz dozens of people complained of severe headaches, weakness, and nosebleeds. As a result, nine people were urgently hospitalized with symptoms of fairly severe poisoning, including four children. A further 42 inhabitants of the village have been diagnosed as suffering mild poisoning.

It must be said that on 30 April, after the incident of the mass poisoning of the inhabitants in (Muzhichya-Pavlovka) a session of the Orenburg Obkom Bureau took place. A principled appraisal was finally given of the fact that for 10 years now the gas plant had been operating without any kind of gas purification. The demand by Comrade (Verishchagin), senior doctor of the oblast sanitation and epidemic station, to halt the work of the gas plant was supported.

For the time being, the plant has not been shut down. How do the gas workers justify their decision? They are attempting to appeal to higher authority against the decision of our senior sanitation doctor. From our point of view, the time has come to find out those specifically guilty for the emission in question. But today it must be said as clearly as possible that it would be at least unjust to search out those guilty only in the Orenburg offices, including among the new management of the Orenburg Gas Industry Association. The time has come to ask those who for many years issued reports on the successes of the gas workers, received prizes and awards, and were promoted to superior work while understanding full well the cost that we pay for such successes.

I have in mind Comrade Chernomydrin, former director of the gas refining plant and currently USSR Minister of Gas Industry, and his deputies and also Orenburg gas workers Comrades Vyakhirev and Sheremet. Evidently the time has come for them, albeit only briefly, to return to their native Orenburg and to look their fellow townspeople in the eye and to reply as to how long we are going to continue striving for unheard of successes in the cause of fulfilling and overfulfilling plan targets at any cost, including the health of the children. [end recording]

That was an excerpt from a report by our correspondent Pavel Rykov. As we were preparing this edition of "Latest News" we also decided to give the floor to representatives of the other side; those toward whom the criticism was addressed.

Our correspondent Igor Zorin telephoned the acting USSR Minister of Gas Industry, First Deputy Minister Rem Ivanovich Vyakhirev. There is a recording of that conversation:

[Begin recording] [Zorin] Rem Ivanovich?

[Vyakhirev] Yes.

[Zorin] Today we had a report from Orenburg in which the issue was raised for the fourth time regarding the fact that everything is not quite as it should be in the airspace over Orenburg. Do you know anything about this problem?

[Vyakhirev] I could not help knowing, could I? I went there to the bureau meeting.

[Zorin] Before the May Day holidays?

[Vyakhirev] On the morning of the 30th I was at the party committee bureau meeting.

[Zorin] What was your reaction to that?

[Vyakhirev] Some measures were taken there on the spot; some measures. But part of the general measures that we are now examining and will assign the course of this week include a number of projects coming up in the plan for capital construction. We have said what is to be done, and those measures have been taken—urgent ones. Some projects need to be introduced so that the air, as a whole, is normal. These steps, measures, will be assigned in the course of this week. On the 5th, representatives of the institute will be here in Moscow with all the calculations on the maximum releases. They will work things out in 2 days. I think that on the 7th we shall make a major decision to ensure that the situation in general is improved this year.

[Zorin] Rem Ivanovich, you worked there at one time, didn't you?

[Vyakhirev] Naturally, I did.

[Zorin] What job were you doing then?

[Vyakhirev] I was director of mining operations and I was the chief engineer of the association.

[Zorin] Our correspondent says the following: On the eve of the holiday one of these plumes covered the village of (Muzhichya-Pavlovka). It happened in the evening. On the following day, dozens of people on the kolkhoz complained of severe headaches, weakness, and nosebleeds. As a result nine people were urgently hospitalized, including four children. And you say that there are no reasons for intervention.

[Vyakiren] Reasons for administrative intervention. What do we need administrative intervention for now? I am saying that there were no reasons to allow that incident to happen, that occurred on the eve of the public holidays. They could have prevented it from happening themselves, even those who were on shift at the plant.

[Zorin] Does this mean the shift was to blame?

[Zyskhirev] Both the shift and the plant managers. Our comrades there simply deserted the (?villagers). As I understand it, it was just foolhardiness, it was just ordinary common or garden stupidity, bungling. Let the public prosecutor there take it up with them. If a crime has been committed regarding the operational rules, that is commonplace. But rules are rules, and you have your head on your shoulders, too. You have to think about people to begin with. This was an inhuman attitude to people on the part of the plant.

[Zorin] In general, you do not accept the criticism leveled at you by the oblast committee?

[Vyakhirev] Why? We accept reasonable criticism. For a long time the ministry did not make a decision about resettling the people from that (Pavlovka). Then, when they did take the decision, they did not manage to get a site allocated for that village, for the new point. Probably we are in some way to blame for this.

[Zorin] Do you think the gas purification system at the gas processing plant is operating well, normally, up to the present day?

[Vyakhirev] No, up to the present it is not working well. The purification is not complete.

[Zorin] All the same, permit me to disagree with you, Rem Ivanovich, on the point that a year ago you said that there was an acute problem there. Now a year has passed and the problem has in no way been solved, although a decision has been made. So, I would like you to somehow appraise this moment from a critical point of view as the first deputy minister.

[Vyakhirev] Well, first, it is not a year, it is probably not a year, we must have a look when the decision was made. That was already in the second half of the year. This means I am telling you from a critical point of view that we together with the oblispolkom were not able to speed up this work. There you are, some of the blame here lies with us. We promised at the bureau, and then to the people, the next year, before the next project of any kind goes into operation, the amount of discharges will be considerably reduced and the situation in populated points will be normal. This is not just a promise, this will be done. It definitely will be done. [end recording]

You know, comrades, the answers given by Comrade Vyakhirev have left me with two impressions. On the one hand, it was comforting to hear that in the ministry on a sufficiently high level they are preparing to take specific radical measures to eliminate the dangerous situation. Consequently, we can hope a grievous incident similar to the one that occurred will not happen again. On the other hand, I cannot stop thinking that surely it was not necessary to wait long years to make a decision, the rationality and opportuneness of which no one doubts. Surely, at the moment, in the course of restructuring when we are awaiting bold and enterprising decisions from those managing the economy, the intervention of the public and the mass media, in the given case, all-union radio, should not have been necessary.

And then we are inclined to share the opinion of our correspondent in Orenburg and other residents of Orenburg that the person to blame for what has happened should not be sought in Orenburg. The responsibility lies on the managment of the industry. As you heard just now, Comrade Vyakhirev assured us that before the next project of any kind goes into operation, the amount of discharges will be considerably reduced and the situation will be normal. All-union radio takes it upon itself to keep an eye on these promises made by the management of the ministry.

Today we received a report that the oblast prosecutor's office had begun a criminal case regarding the poisoning of people.

Academics, 'Skeptic' Debate Restructuring

PM0405115188 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 3 May 88 p 3

[Unattributed "Topical Dialogue With a Third Participant" between Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Yu. Levada, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Sheynis, and an unidentified "Skeptic" under the rubric "More Democracy—More Socialism": "Where Will We Get Our Second Wind"; date and place of discussion not given—first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA KULTURA introduction]

[Text] How is restructuring progressing? How irreversible are the things it has brought into our life? Why are the dissatisfaction and alarm not abating? These and

other questions are being asked on a daily basis and they demand an answer. After all, restructuring needs sober self-appraisal and self-criticism. A third, anonymous interlocutor is taking part in the conversation in addition to the sociologist and the economist. He is the Skeptic. Now that unthinking optimism has faded somewhat, skepticism and skeptics can be encountered in the most diverse guises. We invited to the conversation a Skeptic who expresses our own alarms, doubts, reservations. Can he be convinced of anything at all? Let us try to clarify his positions and, in our own turn, raise some honest doubts about them.

Tension of the Time [subhead]

Levada: In the 3 years of restructuring there has perhaps been no other period abounding with so many events of fundamental importance as, for example, the period between November 1987 and April of this year. I have both foreign and domestic events in mind.

Sheynis: Let us look back at the past to appraise this. A quest took place at the first stage, from March 1985 until approximately the fall of 1986, in the course of which we were still only elaborating realistic ideas about the gravity of the problems which had accumulated in more than 50 years of our history, and about the means and goals—yes, the goals!—of transformations. Quite often we set incorrect guidelines (like comprehensive acceleration, for example) and jumped at unsuitable means.... It was only at the second stage that the strategic triad started taking shape: New political thinking, democratization, radical economic reform. It would be difficult not to link this to the fact that the personnel structure of the top political leadership underwent a substantial change between January and June last year.

What looks to me like a new stage began in the late fall of last year, but we failed to immediately perceive it. New opportunities emerged (Afghanistan and the treaty on intermediate-range missiles—these are no longer just exchanges of handshakes or declarations of intent). At the same time, extremely serious dangers emerged.

Skeptic: Is it not actually a fact that, as the self-determination of restructuring progresses, what could be described as the initial euphoria of unanimity regarding its tasks is vanishing?

Levada: What unanimity are we talking about? There seemed to be total agreement when the new course was proclaimed. In actual fact, it was the product of a combination of different forces and even different ideological currents. Some were carried away by the initial slogans of restructuring, others were stunned, yet others found nothing to object to, a fourth group hoped that the slogans would remain only on paper, and so on.

Sheynis: The situation then started changing. The confusion of conservatives and their hopes that the reforms would spontaneously come full circle are receding into the past. Glasnost has actually helped them to assess the situation and consolidate themselves, even though, of course, their strength does not lie in glasnost. On the other hand, in restructuring itself there is now a tangible gap between the declarations and the actual progress. Inconsistency in the implementation of economic reform, and not just of economic reform, has come to light.

Levada: A regrouping of forces is also taking place: Some are switching sides to the ranks of overt or covert opposition, others are being galvanized into active work.... The positions of supporters, opponents, fence-sitters, and so on are being reappraised in a dynamic process.

Skeptic: The result is that, while striving to avoid the crisis which loomed during the "stagnation" years, we are coming up against new exacerbations.

Sheynis: Let us not be scared of words. No two crises are the same. Restructuring cannot progress according to a schedule, without giving rise to unforeseen exacerbations—economic, social, and political. The question is not how to avoid crises but how to foresee them, how to alleviate them, and how to cope with them while incurring the least possible damage.

Levada: Speaking about exacerbations in the political situation, we experienced one of them in the late fall of last year, when there was an obvious revival of conservative forces. And faith in restructuring declined.... Moods of simple panic developed in places—everyone remembers that.

Skeptic: But surely there were reasons behind this? And were the delays and hesitations in a series of economic and political decisions not linked with the regrouping which took place at that time?

Sheynis: Let's base our judgment on facts. There was no collapse of restructuring. The movement continued, glasnost worked. All this probably made it possible to push the latest exacerbation (March-April 1988) in a different direction. It is worth talking about this in more detail.

Who Supported the "Manifesto?" [subhead]

Levada: Yes, events surrounding the so-called "letter" in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA display the typical signs of political exacerbation. They certainly reflected the growing polarization of social forces. Let us not forget that this article was preceded by a "skirmish" which grew increasingly intense. Let us go no further than recalling the stance that was taken and the tone that was used in the mass criticism of Shatrov's historical plays.

Sheynis: Yes, this article was of course far from the usual sobs about Stalin's time, like the ones that appear in the press at times. PRAVDA called this item the manifesto of antirestructuring forces. Forces! Which were and still are waiting with bated breath for their time to come.

Levada: What sort of forces are these? Judging by the text of the "letter," it was an appeal to three currents which had been separate until that time. First, yesterday's supporters of "moderate" and "balanced" restructuring which would not affect the deepest foundations of society. Second, the witting and unwitting neo-Stalinists, living in hope of a "firm hand" supposedly capable of imposing order. And third, the forces which I would describe as "fundamentalist," those who are inclined to examine social, economic, historical, ecological, and other problems from the viewpoint of national exclusiveness and sinister conspiracies. This indicated with the utmost certainty the target of this bloc: The alliance of the political leadership and the front-ranking section of society.

Sheynis: Yes, these forces perceived the way this article was presented, the way it was reprinted in some places, and the way it was hurriedly implanted in people's minds and protected from criticism as the long-awaited signal for attack.... In some places all "the King's men," who had acquired their skills in campaigns in the past, were mobilized.... All this was intended to be seen by those in the know as something quite definite: The time for letting the "hundred flowers" bloom was past, the time for pulling out "the weeds" had come.

Skeptic: This "letter" has quite a few supporters, but their voices can hardly be heard since the harsh article in PRAVDA. What about "socialist pluralism?"

Sheynis: The article that was published 5 April is not only an ideological but also a political phenomenon since the people behind the "letter" are not ordinary opponents in a dispute. They have on their side the real power of influential "hierarchs" [instantsiya] still not subject to the control of public opinion and also chronic fear. Let us not be naive: Workers within the ideological hierarchy are accustomed to subordination rather than to disputing. It was necessary to explain to these people and to those whom they had succeeded in misleading, in language to which they are accustomed, that the article contradicts the party line elaborated at the 27th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums. Which is what PRAVDA did.

But I can understand your anxiety. Let me voice my belief: The opponents of reform, insofar as they actually exist, must be given an opportunity to publicly voice their views in the dispute. As a matter of fact, Andreyeva herself—as far as I know—has declined to participate in public debate. But the rules for conducting a discussion must, of course, be mandatory for all sides: It is impossible to learn democracy while relying on extraordinary measures. These measures can be used—but by no means always—to resolve acute situations but not to prevent them.

"New" Labels and Old Fears [subhead]

Skeptic: Alas, this was not the last crisis and not even the sole one during the weeks of this complex spring. What I have in mind are the events around Nagorno-Karabakh and—and this is equally important!—the way we (in the press and not just in the press) reacted to this situation.

Levada: Abandoning the myth about the fundamentally conflict-free nature of our society is not an easy process. There have been and there will be conflicts of interest between different groups, misunderstandings, emotional outbursts. The main point is to learn to treat conflict situations sensibly and to find methods to overcome them in the best possible way. Of course, "to learn" means to elaborate the necessary social mechanisms for examining the problems, patiently reconciling interests, and so on.

Sheynis: The necessary elements of such a mechanism are glasnost, democratic attitudes, opportunities for a free exchange of opinions on the most difficult questions, and of course responsibility. Did we display these qualities on the eve of and during the Transcaucasus events?

Skeptic: Yes, we learn all the details about railroad accidents with only a few hours' delay, but whenever some tiny corner of social life or national relations gets out of normal control the traditional mechanism of silence comes into operation, and hunts for perfidious "extremists" and instigators from overseas are launched.

Sheynis: Glasnost is muffled at the time when it is most needed. How many rumors there were about the number of casualties in Sumgait. What should have been done was not only to give the numbers but also to name each casualty. This would have pushed our society toward realizing the priceless value of each human life. We have gotten too accustomed to counting in millions.

Levada: There is another side to the question. The old mechanism for "solving" conflict situations in accordance with the three-element formula of "instigators," "extremists," and "competent organs" is tenacious; it still enjoys influence, if not trust. This is also a powerful and conventional stereotype and a means for substituting a prohibition on reporting for the solution of the problem. Meanwhile, in this instance we came up against a conflict situation involving not just individuals but masses of people. Maybe the time has come to abandon the use of intimidating labels; they obstruct considered and realistic analysis.

Sheynis: Incidentally a responsible dialogue whose outcome is not predetermined is the most correct method for isolating irresponsible people from mass movements and for finding sensible compromises.

Skeptic: Does it not seem to you that the "galloping" development in the sphere of glasnost is itself fraught with certain dangers? All the excesses of impatience (in the "Trifonov" sense) occurred not in the darkest periods but actually at times when exploding hopes outstripped the actual course of events. The combination of impatience and intolerance, coupled with the explosive charge of unsolved problems accumulated in various "corners" of our home, plus the "standard" of discussion which is alas typical of almost all participants in our arguments.... There is a need for a solid safety margin (including staunchness of spirit among the crew and the helmsmen) to ensure that the ship does not sail off course, and even that it simply remains afloat.

Levada: A serious question, but incorrectly formulated. A social system's "safety margin" is a variable quantity, it depends on the "crew's" confidence in the correctness of the course, on the support of the masses, and on the work of democratic institutions—all this must be either consolidated or created afresh. There is simply no other way. If you are afraid of wolves, don't wander through the forest. Work must be done to reduce the defects, not to use them for intimidation. Furthermore, hidden conflicts rock the ship equally as much and, what is even worse, they make it impossible to notice the dangerous holes. Every day of glasnost contributes to the irreversibility of restructuring.

Skeptic: And so, you are banking on glasnost. But is this "lifesaving" rope not a bit too thin today? Is it not rather too unusual for the vast bulk of the population? And incidentally, the law on glasnost which was promised more than 1 year ago has still not appeared even for discussion purposes.

Levada: It would be useful to have a law. If the draft is getting bogged down "behind office doors," why should there not be an alternative suggested for discussion "from below," by the Academy of Sciences or the Journalists' or the Writers' Union, for example? But let us not fall for "juridical fetishism." At times of transition laws do not play a paramount role: Decisions are made on the basis of precedents created by social practice, the correlation of forces, and the gaining of key positions.

Skeptic: How powerful can a movement be if it is prompted by initiative from above?

Sheynis: There is a reciprocal link here. Yes, restructuring was launched from above but it is backed by the entire party and the whole people. Its political mainstay comprises the new political thinking and the new majority within the leadership which replaced the old Brezhnev-Suslov nucleus. But there can be no doubt that the formation of the new nucleus reflected a social need. In 1985 the top political leadership not only got the situation moving but also, step by step, expanded the zone of public activeness. Afterward all of our society's living and creative forces, those which today could be described as "the support echelon," started entering the political arena.

Skeptic: Who are they—an ancient Greek chorus in the theater, or an audience who have wandered into the show for want of anything else to do?

Levada: No, they are economic leaders oriented toward initiative. Engineers and workers who want to do real work for appropriate earnings, who are willing and able to be the masters of production. Farmers who are capable of being masters of the land. Socially responsible young people. The intelligentsia who live for society and are capable of expressing its needs. Lively and active forces in the party and outside it, in old and new public organizations, movements, and groups.

Sheynis: It is noteworthy that the main link between the headquarters and the aktiv of restructuring today is not administrative structures, but the mass communications media (or rather, the advanced ones), which are at last beginning to play a worthy role in our society. But this must be supplemented both organizationally and institutionally, within the framework of the renewal of social mechanisms.

Levada: It is important to add: It is the press and the documentary cinema that are making good the lack of protection for socially active citizens, whom restructuring so urgently needs. You only have to recall worker and sociologist A. Alekseyev from Leningrad, worker V. Bogdanov from Riga, kolkhoz leader V. Belokon from Odessa Oblast, social scientist G. Strashko from Nezhin, and many others. The more resolutely the press defends people like these, the more surely new activists will become involved in the struggle and the less secure the oprichniki [tsarist military police] will feel.

Skeptic: Granted. But the top of our political pyramid is built on the broad base of the apparatus, in which the braking forces are markedly active. The aktiv which is really prepared to fight for restructuring is nevertheless a minority of the people. Among the majority, there is a widespread conviction: "Restructuring has not reached us; everything is the way it was before." If so, the danger persists of a repetition of what happened in 1964 and subsequent years. Historical experience shows that an unsuccessful reform, causing disappointment to some and inspiring in others fear for their privileges, is inevitably followed by a counterreform.

Dangers and Hopes [subhead]

Levada: Now we come to the most difficult questions. First: Do the leaders of the restructuring have the determination to continue the job as boldly as they began it?

Will they not be overwhelmed by uncontrollable processes? And second: How can the broad people's masses be "enlisted" more energetically and actively in restructuring, how can its aktiv and its social base be extended?

Sheynis: Well, let us discuss what we can set against the danger of a repetition of 1964. In my view the social processes that have begun have not only a "positive," but also a "negative" basis, which is equally important. The "positive" side is obvious, but on the "negative" side there is the exhaustion (or near exhaustion) of the majority of the economic, political, and ideological means by which a great country tackled its own tasks and established its place in the world. As long ago as January last year it was said: There is no retreat for us. And there is no sign of anyone being particularly eager for an outright return to the past. If the conservatives had any remotely realistic alternative to restructuring, you need have no doubt that it would long since have been mobilized and proposed.

Skeptic: But it is not incumbent on them to propose an integrated program. The criticism of the real and imaginary defects of restructuring—one, awakened but as yet unfulfilled hopes that boomerang; two, the exploitation of prejudices and phobias of every kind; three, nostalgia for firm "order"; four... I could go on...

Levada: All the same, these rags and tatters can hardly be tailored to make a program for those who would have to put the political turnaround into practice.

Skeptic: But they are quite capable of upsetting the restructuring.

Sheynis: There is a problem here. As yet there have been no really tangible changes for the better in the elementary living conditions of millions of people, and as time goes on the time factor and the lag behind words and slogans will operate more powerfully against restructuring. In the socioeconomic sphere resolute measures must be carried out urgently, because only they can provide a firm social base for restructuring, replace the wait-and-see attitude of millions of people with an active stance, and bar the path to a critical turn of events that could offer the desired opportunity to the opponents of restructuring. At the same time the situation on the consumer market is causing people extreme irritation. We must get rid of the idea that delays on the path of renewal are annoying, but not dangerous.

Levada: But let us be realists. It is time we became aware of the exceptional (objective!) complexity of making a disaster-free transition from one economic system to another. The transition to the new economic mechanism, and still more the creation of an economy that is efficient by international standards, is a lengthy process that will take many years.

Sheynis: Agreed. But we do not have that much time to satisfy people's elementary requirements. We are too timid in implementing measures which may be palliatives, but can produce rapid results. For instance, while verbally recognizing the family contract, we are not doing enough to give the "Arkhangelsk peasant" most-favored status. On equal terms, for instance, with the defense industry. That is our problem today. The fear of "big earnings" is still widespread. We must raise the prestige of honest earnings and stop being afraid. We must fight dishonest income, but learn to rejoice in money honestly earned.

Levada: Let us go further. Our political and ideological sphere needs transformations as radical as those in the economy. It is not easy to get used to this idea (look how many decades we spent "getting used to" the idea of economic reform!). The link here is now recognized by everyone: Economic tasks cannot be resolved without political ones, nor political tasks without overcoming obsolete stereotypes in thinking.

Sheynis: The pecularity of the situation here is, in my view, that discarding stereotypes begins with foreign policy thinking, with a new awareness of our place in the wrold, and from there moves onto domestic problems. Although hitches occur here too. The "enemy image" which over the decades created in our society the psychological climate of a besieged fortress where any independent thought is an impermissible luxury, is apparently losing its force. Yet from time to time we hear warnings about the machinations of foreign journalists, diplomats, and emigres and the special services that are behind them.

Levada: Yes, but in another area we have progressed much further. The "battle for the past" that has been waged with such intensity in our literature in recent months is also a struggle for new thinking, and not only in relation to our history. Historical criticism, although it sometimes lacks depth, today also fulfills an important "safeguarding" function.

Skeptic: But how reliable is that barrier as a safeguard against rolling back? People sometimes say that to carry out an in-depth reform you need a strong power.

Sheynis: Strong power and democracy are not opposite poles. Why should we panic because of our inconsistency, our lack of familiarity with democratic procedures? Democracy can only be learned in the conditions of building democracy.

The forthcoming party conference will, it is to be hoped, make a contribution to this building of democracy. It will be able to reflect a considerably higher level of public awareness in the country than just over 2 years ago, when the present elected party organs were formed. And all the officials will not necessarily have the decisive voice at the party conference. Recently the party and country have heard the voices of scientists, writers, journalists,

public figures, and captains of industry at various levels, resolutely upholding the ideas of renewal—their participation in the party forum will certainly enrich its work.

Levada: It would be useful for the conference itself to be a working conference, not just for show. With detailed discussion of various options for the reform of party and state structures. With the thorough study of questions, in section meetings...

Sheynis: So a crystallization of social sentiments is taking place, they are turning into positions around which a struggle of opinions can take place... That is incomparably more valuable than a show of unanimous thought (behind which, often enough, there was simply no thought at all). If we do not stop halfway, setting new social forces in motion will more than compensate for the loss of the dubious support of the disciples of conservatively balanced changes.

An important lesson can be learned from our experience. Like any complex social process, restructuring cannot go smoothly and only progressively. Errors, exacerbations, even crises have taken place and will take place. We must learn (and here we are still at elementary school) to withstand and overcome them. And not to panic, not to play along with the sentiments that sometimes flare up: "Restructuring is finished"; not to connive at skepticism, but to do the job—assert the ideas and structure of restructuring.

Levada: I would add one more thing: There are not and cannot be any automatic guarantees of success, any guarantees that are "external" in relation to the activity of society itself. The likelihood of the process becoming irreversible can be increased through the development and deepening of restructuring itself. That is the only way it can gain its second wind.

Yeltsin Article Marks Move From 'Wilderness'

AU0305151888 Paris AFP in English 1508 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Moscow, May 3 (AFP)—A Soviet journal has published the first article by Boris Yeltsin since he was sacked as Moscow Communist Party chief, in a move seen as confirming his gradual return from the political wilderness.

Mr. Yeltsin, who is now vice-president of the State Construction Committee (Gosstroy), was quoted in the specialist construction periodical STROITELNAYA GAZETA and his article was mainly devoted to building industry problems.

But the former Moscow party leader, dismissed for "political immaturity" for a speech he made last October, also made a few general remarks, including a comment that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroyka, or economic restructuring policy, had entered a "decisive phase."

The article was the first to be published in the Soviet Union since his sacking in November. It implicitly confirmed that he is making a gradual return to public life.

Mr. Yeltsin spoke to an AFP correspondent Sunday in his first interview with the Western press since his dismissal but a recent interview he gave to the German-language edition of MOSCOW NEWS has not been carried in Russian editions.

Suggests Giving Up Projects

LD0305185088 Moscow World Service in English 1700 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] The first deputy chairman of the Soviet Building Agency has suggested slashing the number of projects and giving up outdated ones. Boris Yeltsin told the paper STROITELNAYA GAZETA about moves to accelerate scientific and technological progress in this field. He also believes every large scale project must be scrutinized by the public just as the key draft laws are. On the restructuring in the Soviet Union, Yeltsin feels it has moved to the decisive stage. He believes the restructuring can visibly improve housing shortly.

Akhmetova Takes Kazakh Culture Minister Post

LD0405084188 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1400 GMT 3 May 88

[Excerpts] The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has decreed that Comrade Manura Mergaliyevna Akhmetova as minister of culture of the Kazakh SSR. [passage omitted] The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has released Comrade Akhmetova from her duties as deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers in connection with her transfer to the other post.

Letters Urge More Candidate Information

PM0305142188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 88 First Edition p 3

[Readers' letters feature under the rubric "Deliberations Before the Party Conference": "About Trust and Control"—first two paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] The volume of editorial mail devoted to the upcoming partywide forum is growing with every passing day. Problems of the further democratization of intraparty life and, in particular, the process of the appointment of leading cadres, the formation of elective organs, and the implementation of control functions occupy a significant place in the letters.

Diverse and sometimes diametrically opposed views are expressed on this account and this, incidentally, is also reflected in the published selection of letters. Well, truth is born out of argument. What is important is that the overwhelming majority of the letters received are

imbued with concern for ensuring that the views and will of Communists are taken account of as accurately as possible at all levels and that only the most worthy, respected, and competent people capable of ensuring the success of restructuring are appointed to senior posts in the party.

How Should a Committee Be Elected? [subhead]

I have pondered more than once why our elective party aktiv is frequently passive in practice. This is the conclusion I have reached: Is it not because in actual fact it is not elected, rather a vote is taken on a list that has been compiled in advance. Delegates are acquainted with the list at a brief meeting during a break at the conference. Frankly speaking, is this kind of acquaintance with future members of the party raykom or obkom sufficient to work out "who is who" and to make sure that only really worthy people are elected onto the committee? This, in my view, explains why members of elective organs sometimes act timidly vis-a-vis the apparatus and why they do not feel responsibility in respect of their primary organizations.

Of course, this may be putting it too categorically. However, essentially this is what happens: Obliging people, people who are willing to "give their vote" at plenums to a text drafted by apparatus officials rather than real, thinking fighters capable of defending a just cause get elected onto committees. I therefore believe the question of the formation of elective organs—from raykoms to the Central Committee—should be discussed at the 19th all-union party conference.

How do I think this should be done? When nominating delegates to the rayon party conference, Communists could name comrades who, in their opinion, could successfully implement the duties of party raykom or obkom members. At the local level it is more obvious which people in the organization are worthy according to all criteria to be elected onto party committees. This, I believe, could also apply to nominations to the Central Committee, although, naturally, by no means every primary party organization has the honor of sending a representative to the Central Committee. It would be a good idea to introduce the candidates proposed by primary party organizations for election to a superior party organ in the local press, publishing their photograph and a brief account about their work and possibly also their family. This should not be kept in general terms but should reveal, especially in the case of leaders, what successes the collective or the region has achieved during the time it has been headed by the candidate and how rank and file workers have distinguished themselves. Moral qualities should also be mentioned. I am confident that people would react, that they would express their opinion as to whether specific people are fit to be on party committees.

In my opinion this procedure would in no way detract from the role of conferences or congresses in forming elective organs. On the other hand, the elective aktiv would be more deeply aware of its responsibility to primary organizations for the fate of restructuring and would more fully express the organizations' will.

It would also not be out of place to elect the first secretary (and possibly also all the other secretaries) of party raykoms or obkoms in secret ballot directly at the conference. This would make it possible to demonstrate more fully their prestige and their professional and moral qualities. Subsequently, in the period between conferences, it might be useful to hear their reports at party committee plenums and, if necessary, to decide by secret ballot whether the comrade is worthy of remaining in the post to which he was elected.

Lastly, we will be talking about "pocket" secretaries for as long as they remain materially dependent on enterprise or farm managers. It seems to be that it might be worthwhile in respect of major party committees to introduce the status of party Central Committee, obkom, and kraykom party organizers who would be on a par with economic managers in terms of wages and prestige. The means can be found. Should they really be of primary concern in view of the fact that primary party organizations have to shoulder the main burden of restructuring? This means these components should be headed by leaders who do not hang on economic managers' every word, who are able firmly to implement the party line.

G. Malyy, machine operator at the kolkhoz named for Kotovskiy, party obkom member, Khotinskiy Rayon, Chernovitsy Oblast.

This Alone Is Not Democracy [subhead]

One kind of proposal has been published in PRAVDA and other newspapers more than once. This is what it boils down to: Party committee secretaries, especially first secretaries, should be elected on a competitive basis in a direct ballot by the whole organization, that is to say separately from the election of committee or bureau members.

Naturally, these proposals are a result of the fresh wind of restructuring. People are tired of acting as extras rather than participants in policy making and, furthermore, they are motivated by the desire to acquire certain guarantees that the direction of this wind will not change. But how can what is being proposed in this case be brought into line with the fundamental principle of collective leadership?

If it is a question of a party committee electing a secretary at its plenum from several candidates who are on the same committee, I can understand this. Here everything is correct. But to elect secretaries in direct ballot by the whole organization? I do not know; maybe

it would simplify matters, but it is difficult not to perceive this election of one individual as distinct from the others as anything but the election of some kind of "leader," a boss, a kind of local "Napoleon." After all, a party leader who has been elected in this way can always reply to all the committee's objections: I was elected by the organization, it has given me the power, and it is my job to wield this power and your job to obey my instructions. To change his views on anything it will be necessary again to call together the whole organization. And so in the guise of the simple involvement of the broad party masses in the election of a party leader you may acquire something that is very remote from the principles of democratic centralism.

If committee or bureau members are elected by different methods, there will be no equality and consequently no collective leadership in the true sense of the word in the work of these organs. A secretary is a committee member, he leads and organizes its work and therefore he must be elected by the committee members and no one else.

The same applies to proposals on limited tenure of elective party posts. The question, it seems to me, is not how many times an individual is elected a committee or bureau member or secretary, but rather whether there is an alternative candidate for the post. This alternative candidate must appear not because someone's term of office has expired while the candidate has been waiting for his finest hour to come, but because the candidate has fresh ideas and proposals, more energy, and more drive. All this must, of course be verified by the party organization. Otherwise the change in personalities will be nothing but utter formalism.

A. Makarov, Leningrad.

In Short [subhead]

Despite everything, the existing system of elections to leading party organs in a way limits the responsibility of ranking leaders in respect of the mass of rank and file Communists. After all, the latter are in the minority in these organs and this is not right. The more workers and kolkhoz members—in short, rank and file party members—there are in leading organs, the more firmly established will democratic principles become in all spheres of our social life. I say "in all spheres" because the example of the party will force both the soviets and trade union organizations to restructure themselves correspondingly. There will be less bureaucracy and out-and-out stage management and more courageous questing, fresh ideas, and unorthodox decisions and actions.

I. Sankov, war and labor veteran, CPSU member since 1941, Leningrad.

Communist leaders must be more "down to earth", that is to say they must be closer to the people, their aspirations and concerns. Rather than standing aloof and surrounding themselves with some kind of a wall for the only reason that they, you see, wield power. This is still happening in our life.

Many of our current senior comrades are relatively far removed from the life of ordinary people, they know about their problems from hearsay, they do not have to wait in line to buy things. Has not the time come to move on to practical actions from words and appeals to live in Leninist fashion? It seems to me that the moral aspect of the question should also be aired during the discussiion at the the all-union party conference.

M. Karamushko, Moscow.

I wholeheartedly support the article by N. Sokolov entitled "Strictly According to Conscience" published in PRAVDA 18 March which proposed that the TsKK [Central Control Commission] be revived in the party. The author is right! In terms of its consequences the abolition of the control commissions was one of the most harmful actions taken by Stalin the perjurer, who blatantly flouted Lenin's last behest. Life has proved incontrovertibly that the absence in the party of strict self-control that is independent of operational organs creates conditions for the self-reproduction of bureaucracy, voluntarism, and stagnation.

Sergo Ordzhonikidze, addressing the 16th party congress, described the TsKK-RKI [Central Control Commission-Worker Peasant Inspectorate] as a "marvelous force." I have raised the question of its revival more than once in letters to congresses, dating back to the 20th Congress. I mentioned it personally to N.S. Khruschchev, who replied that he "agreed but that it would be very difficult to put into practice." I am convinced that the 19th All-Union Party Conference which is being convened in the favorable atmosphere of restructuring will be capable of finally resolving this important question.

V. Ratnikov, CPSU member since 1926, Moscow.

If the TsKK is restored in the party as has been proposed, only absolutely honest party members entirely without blemish, so to speak, in terms of their professional and personal qualities—that is, people devoid of ambition, arrogance, and hot temper—can be considered for this organ.

Personally I do not believe the revival of the control commissions will lead to dyarchy in the party, as some people fear. The TsKK would be entirely occupied with control work (after all no one can guarantee that the Uzbek, Rostov, and Kirgiz affairs will not repeat themselves unless the party's control functions are stepped up). In addition it would be necessary for both party committees and control commissions to defend their

positions and viewpoints with better reasoning, reports and plenums would become more pointed and, consequently, the decisions adopted would be more correct, accurate, and effective.

G. Goncharov, Lvov.

Readers on Elections, 'Right To Choose'
PM281347 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Apr 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by Yuriy Orlik, IZVESTIYA deputy editor for the letters department, under the rubric "Reading the Mail": "The Right To Choose"]

[Text] The need to restructure our political system and create a mechanism of power and management which will ensure the really democratic development of society is obvious to the majority today. To put it more simply, we cannot live the way we lived yesterday. In this sense there is not a grain of exaggeration in the assertion that our people have achieved restructuring through painful experience.

"For decades the unspoken principle that the people are not the subject but the object of politics held sway among us and is still professed by many people at various levels of management," jurist V. Zaretskiy writes from Vitebsk, interpreting the past. "Many of our democratic institutions were turned into formal establishments in which the people were allocated the role of a Greek chorus praising 'the wisdom of the leaders' and their 'concern for the people's good.' Little by little a situation took shape where, to use the expression of K. Marx, the government hears its own voice, knows that it hears only its own voice, yet nevertheless maintains the self-deception that it hears the voice of the people, as well as demanding that the people maintain that self-deception... The process of democratization that we have begun is like a slightly opened door to a stuffy room full of musty air."

Staying with the proffered metaphor, the chief task today is to prevent this door from slamming shut (there are those who want this to happen!). Our task is, on the contrary, to fling it wider open and air our house. We really do need democracy like we need air.

From the mass of letters which speak of this I will select just those which deal with soviets' activity and the principles of their formation. "The soviets' present form does not accord with life," V. Kovalev of Rostov-na-Donu believes. "They have degenerated from the power of the people into power in the people's name." "We must speak about the real revival of Soviet power in the way Lenin understood it," N. Vybornov of Klaypeda remarks. "For the soviets are the basis, the linchpin of our political system. Why then do we keep them in secondary roles?"

Here is a thought repeated in many letters: From being organs of management and people's power, the soviets have turned into organs for approving and supporting decisions which they have not made. "The soviets work formally," K. Menetskiy, a CPSU member from Kiev, remarks. "The people's elected representatives are not prepared to use their powers, and they uncomplainingly rubber-stamp all decisions without exception. One of the reasons is the unfortunate selection (if I may put it this way) of the corps of deputies. Throughout this process you sense the hand of a director-bureaucrat who selects quiet, obedient deputies for himself, ensuring himself a tranquil life." "A situation has taken shape," K. Menetskiy continues, "in which power is in the hands of the management apparatus, not with deputies elected by the people. The apparatus must only serve the elective organ, while in fact it takes its place. It is precisely in the apparatus that the aforementioned directors work, and it is in the apparatus that everything is decided in secret, draft resolutions are prepared, and speeches are written and combed through. These distortions in the power structure and in its functioning must be eradicated."

The very practice of forming state organs does not accord with the demands of the time or the spirit of restructuring. "For a long time we did not have real elections," R. Tevlin of Kiev remarks, "and we do not have them to this day. There was and still is voting without a choice. The instruction in Article 53 of the Law 'On Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet' (like the analogous legislative acts on elections to other components of the soviets of people's deputies) that 'when filling out the voting paper, the voter leaves on it the name of the candidate for whom he is voting, while crossing out the names of others,' appears simply absurd, to put it mildly. There was no other candidate. What is needed is a full-value, truly democratic reform of the Soviet electoral system." "Radical, not decorative," S. Bednyy of Semipalatinsk emphasizes.

The first condition for the democratization of elections is to create the very possibility of a choice; that is, to nominate several candidates for one seat. The creation of multiseat okrugs is the first step toward this. But precisely the first step. "The nomenklatura principle for selecting and placing cadres (including in soviets) must be replaced by the principle of competitive selection of worthy people," engineer V. Berdnikov of Vilnius believes. I. Kirin of Yevpatoriya cites the lack of competition and of a free contest of minds and abilities and the system of selection on the recommendation of a higher organ, regardless of public opinion, as accounting for the fact that "there are so many barely competent, mediocre individuals" in important administrative posts and in the party and soviet apparatus.

One of the issues most discussed in the mail is that of who should be a deputy. Very diverse opinions are voiced. But there is probably one that gives rise to no doubt: Representation of the people must be truly of the people, "and not a meeting of leading officials" (G.

Stelmakh, Poltava). "A deputy's badge is not an adornment on a leader's jacket lapel" (R. Vanchadze, Rustavi). "People who are deputies in name only are of little use," V. Vlasov of Voronezh is convinced. "It would be more expedient to increase the number of workers, kolkhoz members, and ordinary citizens—the people!—in the soviets at the expense of such figurehead deputies. Remember Lenin's testament, when he recommended enlarging the Central Committee with members of the working class. And he associated renewal and the improved activity of the apparatus with this." V. Drokin of Belgorod also refers to Lenin: "I cannot remember word for word, but I have encountered Lenin's idea that people must be taken constantly from the worker environment to do leading work. They have greater knowledge of the people's needs. He suggested that workers attend Politburo sessions. Is it not time for us, too, to tear people away from their machine tools, give them a wash and brush, and send them to the Kremlin?"

IZVESTIYA No 64, V. Kuznetsov of Brest Oblast reminds us, carried the "Report on Elections of USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies in Individual Electoral Okrugs." The majority of the new deputies (CPSU obkom first secretaries, union-level ministers, deputy chairmen of republic councils of ministers, prominent military leaders) were elected to replace those who for one reason or another had been dismissed from the post which they held. "It turns out that the rank of deputy is associated with a certain post: If you hold it, you are a deputy; if you lose it—goodbye. Automatically. What question can there be of a choice, of the voters' will? They are not elections but appointments in the guise of elections."

The desire to see people of a different social status in the soviets should not be perceived as mistrust of high-ranking workers on the soviet and party apparatus. It is necessary, readers believe, to change not only the soviets' composition but also the nature of their activity and to turn the soviets into organs which function constantly, and not just at the time of rare sessions. Deputies' activity must become the chief activity, not a supplementary one. Here is what N. Belyayev of Baranovichi writes in this regard: "At present our deputies fulfill their duties in combination with another job, as it were, from time to time, at odd moments. For no one releases them from their main job. Our deputies on the USSR Supreme Soviet are V.I. Filanovich, a spinner at the cotton production association, and Comrade Losev, general director of TASS. Filanovich works a three-shift schedule and has a family, which means that she has very little time left for her work as a deputy. The TASS general director also has enough to do in his main job, it seems to me. Although our city of Baranovichi is small, it has a great many problems. The asphalt covering of many streets is in a terrible condition, and there are mud, holes, and mess all around. The passenger transport system is abominable. And now there is the 'sugar problem' too." "In short," N. Belyayev concludes, "in any city, in any population center, there must be enough cares and problems for a Supreme Soviet deputy to fill 24 hours of every day. Therefore I make a suggestion: Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the union republics must be released from any other work for their whole term as a deputy. A deputy must be domiciled among his voters."

The question of delimiting the functions of state and party organs is also closely linked with the question of altering the composition of the corps of deputies. "I am extremely surprised at the following circumstance," A. Kukso, a CPSU member from Minsk, writes. "When party or state forums are convened, you cannot at once make out from their composition what they are: a Central Committee plenum or a Supreme Soviet session. I am convinced that the unprecedented merging and intertwining of party and state organs of power is undemocratic and hinders the cause."

Taking IZVESTIYA articles as their starting point, readers write that "party organs' violations of the sovereignty of a deputy's activity, administrative pressure, disregard for the opinion of deputies, pushing of one's own people into leadership positions, and direct distortions of socialist legality on various specious pretexts, including references to supposedly higher interests" (V. Delis, Syktyvkar) are, alas, still frequently encountered.

In formulating their demands regarding the activity of administrative organs, particularly the soviets, and the principles of their formation and advocating the radical democratization of our political system, readers are submitting their proposals to the 19th All-Union Party Conference in the expectation of vitally important decisions from it.

Representation Must Truly Reflect People's Will

PM0305105388 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Yuriy Burtin under the rubric "19th Party Conference: Restructuring Tasks": "Freedom of Choice. Concerning Guarantees of Genuine People's Power"]

[Text] It has been said over and over, everyone has heard it and, seemingly, accepted it: The essential purpose of the restructuring that is under way is to democratize all aspects of society's life and to profoundly and consistently transform in a democratic fashion the whole of the current political system. In my view, changing the procedure for nominating candidate deputies for soviets is by no means an insignificant element in this.

There have been several items in the press recently about the need for substantial changes in our election procedure. A specific proposal has been made: To have more than one candidate on the ballot. It has not only been proposed, but it was partly implemented at the recent local soviet elections (as an experiment, in some electoral okrugs) and even in the Soviet of Nationalities elections in one okrug in Voroshilovgrad Oblast. All this is fine, of

course. But one could also say that the aforementioned measures will not have achieved anything if the procedure for nominating candidates is not changed.

Let me cite a personal memory from a long time ago.

It happened exactly 30 years ago. At the USSR Supreme Soviet elections in 1958 my teacher colleagues at the young workers' railroad school in the city of Buy, Kostroma Oblast and I decide to put forward our own candidate. We did it at a general meeting of teachers and students, organized on instructions from the gorkom to second the candidates who had been nominated. There were two of them. The first was RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman F.R. Kozlov—a candidate in the "honorary" category, those who are deliberately withdrawn at the final stage of the election campaign in all of the numerous okrugs where they have been nominated, except for the one in which it has been decided in advance they will run. The second, the real candidate, was S.F. Milevskiy, chairman of a Buy Kolkhoz (he was rapidly becoming at leading light at the time). Having seconded both the candidates, we also proposed our own—Aleksandr Trifonovich Tvardovskiy. And, despite oppposition from the school administration, we managed to obtain a majority of votes for the proposal and get it recorded in the minutes as the resolution of the voters' meeting.

I will omit the details, many of them highly picturesque. The tumultuous meeting itself, which voted out the chairman of the meeting (the school director!), who at first refused to put our proposal to a vote and then tried to declare the majority a minority and opposed a count. The marked atmosphere of animation in the city, the exhilaration, with the city authorities in disarray, not knowing at all how to behave in such a situation—particularly 2 years after the 20th Congress, which had made the old, simple solutions more complicated. The new meeting with students 2 weeks later, lasting well beyond midnight, attended by three party obkom workers, the second secretary making a speech and declaring the results of the previous meeting void. And yet another meeting (that same night, but nearer morning, narrowed down to the school party organization, but with the same important guests attending again), which adopted "organizational conclusions" in respect of the "firebrands."

There were many curious details, but the lesson is more important, the lesson those involved in the story learned from it: The right of initiative at elections, the right to nominate candidate deputies was someone else's, not theirs.

Precisely whose was explained in detail to me the day after the aforementioned meeting by the obkom second secretary. What he said was more or less as follows:

"You must appreciate, dear comrade, that nominations are organized, that there is a precise procedure for it. What is it? Here it is. Before the election campaign has even been announced we receive the schedule. Since it is established what the composition of the Supreme Soviet will be, what percentage of workers and employees, how many women, and so forth, we are told: You have four okrugs. Your first secretary will run in one, you will put forward candidates for the others. In your industry the emphasis is on textiles, so there should be a female textile worker. And since the oblast is basically agricultural, it would be desirable to have one kolkhoz chairman, a party member, and one ordinary female kolkhoz member. We send the schedule out to the rayons and tell them: Prepare specific proposals. When we get the proposals we examine them and send the list to the superior authorities and they approve it and send it back to us... A big, complex business, as you can see, whereas you just went ahead and made a nomination. If you had consulted the gorkom you would have been told: There is a procedure. Independent action is not necessary..."

I thanked my interlocutor. But I remained convinced that independent action was not only necessary, it was absolutely essential. It is not in vain that "independent action" and "democracy" are inseparable concepts in the language of sociology. If there is no "independent action" there are no elections, because what my interlocutor described was in fact not election, but appointment. An appointment made official at the final stage by the voting procedure—with the outcome totally predetermined.

But the way in which soviets are formed demonstrates their quality—it is a direct and clear relationship. If our candidate deputy knows, not just before the voting but before the election campaign has even started, that he is certain to be elected, then to whom, one wonders, is he going to feel grateful, to whom is he going to feel a sense of responsibility? To his electorate or to to those to whom he really owes the honor of being elected? It is scarcely necessary to say that soviets formed in this manner cannot be independent. In such circumstances they can be what they like—a means of administration, an instrument of authority, but not authority itself.

But if today we seriously want to democratize our political system, we cannot and we must not continue to play this game—nominating candidates in accordance with a list that someone has drawn up and approved in advance.

What could hamper the changes? I believe there is absolutely nothing, aside from the commitment of the conservative, bureaucratic part of the apparatus to preserve its own status, aside from the social self-interest of the forces of retardation. There can be no doubt that those forces will find arguments for the inviolable and sacred status quo. For instance, those that were adduced in 1958. Therefore, they should be examined in some detail. Especially as there are probably many people who perfectly sincerely regard such arguments as persuasive.

Argument number one: The party's leading role in Soviet society is embodied in the existing procedure for forming soviets. The abandonment of this procedure, permitting the voters themselves to take the initiative in this matter, would contradict this role. This is what was said, for example, by our Buy and Kostroma opponents, and one can hear the same things even now.

But why should the party's role at elections be expressed in behind-the-scenes, armchair operations that anticipate and effectively replace the free expression of the people's will? Perhaps it should be just the opposite—perhaps the party's leading role is to ensure that their will is expressed as fully as possible and to unleash and encourage the masses' creative initiative? State the question in that way and the justification of an undemocratic procedure for the formation of soviets with reference to the CPSU's leading role falls apart. It becomes perfectly obvious that both the justification and the procedure itself, which has turned elections into a mere formality, are indisputable and immutable only from the viewpoint of the system of relationships which is itself, in its entirety, now being disputed by us and being eradicated by restructuring.

Argument number two: The existing nominating procedure ensures the optimal composition of soviets and the election to them of the people who should be there.

What can one say about this? Number one: To judge whether it is optimal or not, first of all one has to know exactly what the reality is. The composition of the present (11th) convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet can give an idea of this. Especially as, having been elected before restructuring began, it is in this sense no different from many of its predecessors.

Who, then, were the 1,499 deputies who made up the country's supreme legislative body on 4 March 1984 (all the data are cited for that date; the grouping and figures are mine—Yu. Burtin).

First of all, note that certain categories of officials are represented in their entirety, no selection having been made. This applies not only to party and government leaders (CPSU Central Committtee Politburo and Secretariat, 23 people in all), but also to a number of other categories. Including first and second secretaries of union republic Communist Party Central committees (24—not counting those in the first category), chiefs and first deputy chiefs of CPSU Central Committee departments (19), party kraykom and obkom first secretaries (157), USSR Council of Ministers deputy chairmen (12), USSR ministers (78), USSR deputy defense ministers, commanders of branches of the army, groups of forces, military districts, and fleets and other top military commanders (53), chairman of union republics' Supreme Soviet Presidiums (14), chairmen and first deputy chairmen of union republics' Councils of Ministers (27), deputy chairmen of the USSR KGB and chairmen of republic KGB's (16), vice presidents of the USSR Academy of Sciences and presidents of union republics' Academies of Sciences (17), the top leaders of the AUCCTU and republic councils of trade unions (15) and of creative unions, and a number of other state and public organizations and institutions. The total number of deputies whose leading posts predetermined their election to the USSR Supreme Soviet is, according to my count, 565. And one should perhaps add to them the leaders of certain giant industrial enterprises such as the Likhachev Truck Plant and "Uralmash," major shipping lines, and so forth, and also the president of the Academy of Medical Sciences, directors of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Joint Institute of Nuclear Reesearch, and so forth—20 people in all. This group of deputies (coincident, with few exceptions, with the aggregate membership of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission) totals 585 people, or 39 percent of the Supreme Soviet deputies.

How are the remaining 61 percent distributed? There is a definite preponderance of manual or predominantly manual working people—rank and file (inclusive of team leaders and so on) workers, kolkhoz members, and employees: 688, or 46 percent of the total. Of whom 514 are workers (including 150 employed in agriculture), 159 are kolkhoz members, and 15 are employees (sales clerks, telegraph operators, and so forth). This group contains a particularly large number of women—435 out of 688, that is, 63 percent, in contrast to the first group, in which there are only 6 (1 percent); thus there is a very favorable overall percentage of women in the supreme body of state power.

Some 226 deputies' seats, or 15 percent, are left for working people in the intellectual sphere who are not among the "ex officio deputies." Despite their relatively small number, they are the most heterogeneous group. One part (63 people, of whom 43 are women) is made up of rank and file or near rank and file (inclusive of school director and so forth) teachers (15), doctors (15), agronomists and animal specialists (11), engineers (5), and so forth. Another is made up of leading workers of lower and middle rank: kolkhoz chairmen (56), sovkhoz directors (9), directors of industrial enterprises (13), leaders of scientific research institutions and VUZ's (6), party (3) and soviet (2) workers, and so forth; approximately 110 people in all. A third group is composed of those whose official status puts them within close reach of the top bracket (perhaps, in fact, placing them in it, since the dividing line is somewhat hypothetical): chief designers of the Ministry of the Aviation Industry (5), general directors and directors of certain well-known, nationally important enterprises and so on—26 people in all. Finally, a fourth category, comprising prominent representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia: scientists (mainly in the sphere of physical and technical sciences), writers, musicians, and so forth, whose official posts, although probably taken into account, evidently did not play the decisive role in their nomination as Supreme Soviet candidate deputies—27 people in all.

That is the breakdown. From what viewpoint can it be considered optimal? From the viewpoint of proportional representation in the Supreme Soviet with regard to the different social strata and professional groups in the population? Can one talk of proportionality when all the members of a particular category of officials are there, constituting nearly 40 percent of the overall number of deputies?

Incidentally, this is not peculiar to the country's paramount soviet. For example, one would find in the rayon soviet all the personnel in the rayon component of the party and state apparatus occupying a particular range of posts—from raykom first secretary to raykom and rayispolkom department chiefs. The same goes for the oblast soviet and the republic Supreme Soviet—with a corresponding elevation of the rank and widening of the range of "ex officio deputies."

The bias in favor of top officials has to be corrected by a similar bias in the opposite direction—the disproportionately wide representation of "rank and file" workers, with the obvious erosion of the "middle strata," which becomes increasingly marked the higher the soviet's status. Predominant here are either the top leaders of departments and organizations or, on the other hand, garment workers (16), female weavers (19), female kolkhoz members (106)...

But if there is no question of any proportionality here, by what criteria should the existing composition of soviets be regarded as optimal? By the degree of competence of the deputies when it comes to solving the problems of state and society? In light of the data that have been cited, there is not much justification for this, either. No one is going to attempt to give a clear explanation why, in conditions that rule out any "independent" and "spontaneous" action, there are 19 female weavers, for example, in the country's supreme legislative body, but only two lawyers "ex officio": the justice minister and the USSR general prosecutor. So, perhaps, the criterion is the ability to make independent decisions, striking civic energy, firmness, and uncompromising and independent defense of the public interest? This is another hypothesis that scarcely merits serious discussion—it is sufficient to leaf through the record of any session of any convocation with identical votes on all items on the agenda: "Those for? Please put you hands down. Those against? None. Any abstentions? None. Passed unanimously."

So, if there is anything good about the composition of the soviets, constituted by the methods described above, it is only their modesty, efficiency, feeling of being subordinate—in short, their governability. Not insignificant merits, of course, but from what viewpoint? From the viewpoint that accepts as normal and legitimate a "situation where it is not the ispolkom that comes under the soviet, but the soviet that comes under the ispolkom," where the "soviet is a kind of semi-official body which essentially decides nothing": "Everything is essentially decided by the ispolkom, while at sessions the deputies merely raise their hands" (IZVESTIYA, 20 March 1988). From the viewpoint of the bureaucrat who has long been accustomed to regarding soviets not as the "power of the people," something he trots out when the occasion demands, but as the instrument of his own unbridled power.

Finally, argument number three—the reference to difficulties of, so to speak, a practical organizational nature. What would happen, they say, if every plant, kolkhoz or school started putting up its own candidates without any authorization? Pandemonium! Chaos! Dozens of names on one ballot to the total bewilderment and confusion of the unfortunate voter!

No need to panic, no reason at all. Not "everyone" would nominate a candidate, and only those who have a real chance of victory would be nominated. But even if there are too many of them, that does not matter. There would be an election campaign (which in that case would cease to be a formality), with election canvassing, candidates' speeches, articles in the press, and appearances on television—it could be a very visual experience; there are well-honed democratic procedures for preliminary selection of candidates, for whittling the list down to two or three candidates for one deputy's seat. There is the experience of a number of socialist countries in which party and state leaders appear on a combined ballot. Good heavens, we are not the only country in the world with a system of elective organs of power; they now operate nearly everywhere. If the whole world can cope with the difficulties somehow, we also can cope with them—if we so wish.

Of course, for the bureaucrat the present system is more convenient and simpler in every respect. But if one thinks seriously about democratization and if one sees the soviets as indeed the power of the people, from that viewpoint there is no justification for the existing procedure for nominating candidates. After all, what we need in soviets is not a set combination of "bosses" and "bossed," but public figures. People who are thus described not by virtue of their posts or their production indicators, but because of their mentality and temperament. One such was Tvardovskiy whom the Buy teachers and railroad workers had good reason for wanting as their candidate. There are such people today in all strata of society, and the people know them. There is no need to be too concerned about ensuring always that a particular percentage of workers, kolkhoz members, women, and so forth is elected. There is no point in trying to make real life fit a prearranged scheme. If a soviet, even the Supreme Soviet, suddenly finds itself without a single milkmaid or weaver, and, let's say, only 10 or 20 of the obkom first secretaries have been elected, what is terrible about that? And if the combative economists, historians, publicists, writers, directors, and actors who are popular at the moment come in and fill the spaces, is the cause going to suffer as a result? Quite the contrary. We have had enough resolutions and laws "passed unanimously"

(and then amended or repealed unanimously again). No more of that false show, constantly wondering what others will say about us, in which case, very likely, they will say OK. Our tasks are too great and the situation is too serious for us to continue to amuse ourselves with a kind of system of overreporting in the democracy sphere. The only optimal option is the truth.

I do not like references to authorities. They are morally permissible only when there is the opportunity to publicly voice one's disagreement with them. But I am bound to cite some words that were pronounced in our press for the first time in many decades:

"In a sense we are talking today about the need for the rebirth of the power of the soviets as Lenin understood it. It is necessary to make soviets at all levels real functioning, enterprising, authoritative centers of state power and administration. Obviously, this will require a better perception of how soviets should be formed. Consequently, it is necessary to imnprove our electoral system so that the process of the formation of organs of power ensures the active involvement of the people and the careful selection of people capable of ensuring that the soviets operate in accordance with the tasks of restructuring" (M.S. Gorbachev. Speech at the 18 February 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum).

Precisely: For the soviets to be a living, functioning, and truly people's power, for them to be the engines of restructuring, they must be formed by the people themselves.

Change in 'Multi-Tier' Elections Requested

PM290759 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 28 Apr 88 p 1

[Letter from O. Andreyev under the rubric "19th All-Union Conference: I Submit for Discussion!": "How To Elect a Secretary"—boldface as published]

[Text] I deem it of fundamental importance to resolve the question of the procedure for electing leading party workers.

Electability in primary party organizations must be freed from the two-tier system, which is unnecessary in today's conditions, with all Communists electing the party committee or bureau, and then only the members of that organ electing the secretary and his deputy. More scope must be given to Communists to express their will, and they must be given the right to elect the party leader themselves.

Under conditions of the sociopolitical unity of the Soviet people and the strengthening unity of the party and the people, a multi-tier system for electing leading party organs is hardly expedient. For example, we have a six-tier, and in some regions even an eight-tier election system. Rank-and-file Communists and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo are separated by six or eight tiers of elections of delegates and electors.

It would be fair **to give every Communist, and not just party committee members, the right to express his attitude by voting for candidates for the position of party obkom, gorkom, and raykom secretaries. The procedure and mechanics of voting could be worked out through a series of experimental elections. Meetings could be held with a standard agenda—"On Elections of CPSU Obkom, Gorkom, or Raykom Secretaries (including First Secretary)"—in all party organizations in a rayon, city, or oblast.**

This approach to forming elected organs would be more democratic and would help a fuller expression of the will of party masses. The situation at present is such that a Communist takes no part even in elections for CPSU raykom secretaries, cannot actually influence the election of a leader, but must follow his instructions.

For the same purpose, **it would be fairer to hold elections for Central Committee secretaries and the Politburo simultaneously with the election of the CPSU Central Committee by all congress delegates.** I think that such elections would help the conscious strengthening of the unity and cohesion of party ranks under the leadership of authoritative leaders at the head of the CPSU.

I also support the opinion that the CPSU Statutes must include a provision limiting the tenure of Communists in leading party positions to two or three elected terms.

And one more proposal. **To establish genuine democracy in the party, every CPSU member must be given the right not only to challenge and criticize but also to nominate candidates.**

In conclusion, **I submit a proposal concerning the need for most critical review of instructions from the CPSU Central Committee (and also from the AUCCTU and the Komsomol Central Committee) on the election of leadership organs.** These instructions are formal and bureaucratic and do not encourage the influx of new people. Such draft new instructions must without fail be submitted for all-party discussion.

O. Andreyev, Murmansk

'Mailbag' Views Restructuring, Conference Tasks

PM0305153188 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 88 Morning Edition p 3

[Unattributed "From the Editorial Office Mailbag" feature under the rubric "19th Party Conference: Tasks of Restructuring"]

[Excerpts] The Labor Collective's Recommendation [subhead]

I am a nonparty member, but I am not indifferent to party life and the party's strength. On reading articles

about the 19th all-union party conference, I perceive much of what I personally think. This is what I would like to talk about. Many people today have already realized that the party is not an abstract righteous mechanism, always infallible, never mistaken. The party is made up of people with all human attributes and shortcomings. Unfortunately, it very often happens that the sins and vices of individual persons have a grave effect on the lives of people around them. There are plenty of such examples in our history and in daily life. The mechanism for putting the party apparatus into a skid could be very simple: A careerist and degenerate who has made his way to the top selects and elects new cadres in his own image and after his own likeness, who would never recommend honest, principled, and active people. On the other hand, quiet, soft, complaisant, and intimidated people are also valued. But today the party needs fighters, the struggle ahead is most serious.

My view is: While somebody is still a candidate member, the grass roots production collective must organize a poll to find out whether the candidate is worthy or not of being a Communist. Things that might be concealed from or unknown to superior comrades cannot be hidden from one's own collective—everything is known there! If the party is to be flesh of the people's flesh, then let the people recommend party members; this is what I perceive as the basic guarantee of democratization and restructuring.

V. Gamygin [passage omitted]

Control Is Necessary [subhead]

I welcome IZVESTIYA's decision to publish sharp and polemical letters targeted on the 19th party conference. I would like to second one of them, which raised the question of reverting to the Central Control Commission, the Leninist organization of party control, which was autonomous vis-a-vis with the Central Committee. The author cites weighty arguments in favor of such a reorganization, and I will not repeat them. Let me just say that, since history unambiguously indicates that the existing party control mechanism failed to effectively counter the negative subjective processes within the party, this means the mechanism must be changed. Of course, we are not talking about organizations standing above the party. On the contrary. It is well known that the CPSU congress exercises the supreme controlling function. But how many different events may occur between congresses! There must be a new organ to which the congress can delegate the right of control. There is no need at all to delay this important work—the party conference is fully able to accomplish it.

Honored Artist of the RSFSR V. Simonov, Sverdlovsk [passage omitted]

To Elect by Secret Ballot [subhead]

Many people assume that the removability of top leaders is capable of preventing any attempt at establishing a new cult. I think that the solution lies elsewhere—in changing the actual system for electing a leader.

Neither broad glasnost nor open discussion of nominations would save us from making mistakes. Is there a guarantee that, hoping for a fresh breath of air in the leadership, people will not cast their vote for someone who may be new but may also be shortsighted and limited? No, and no again. What we actually need are direct secret ballots, and not within a narrow circle (plenum or bureau session) when the candidate for any high post keeps an intent and questioning eye on you, paralyzing your will. I have no doubt that, had there been secret ballots before, there would have been no cult of Stalin's personality, Brezhnev would have been removed in good time, and now we would not have had to restructure that which they managed to "construct."

V. Luzin, Leningrad

Boldness Needed for CPSU Apparatus Changes

PM020915 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian
28 Apr 88 p 1

[Letter from A. Muranov, first secretary of the Iskitim CPSU Gorkom, under the rubric "19th All-Union Conference: I Submit for Discussion!": "Authority Instead of Authoritarianism"—boldface as published]

[Text] In his last letters, Lenin addressed the topic of internal party building, speaking of the need to improve the party apparatus and its ties with the masses, to protect it from the influence of "purely personal and chance circumstances."

While exposing and overcoming the personality cult within the party, we have, unfortunately, still not profoundly interpreted all its consequences which still affect the practice of our party life, and in particular the "tenacious" system of replacing political leadership by edict methods. So far, there has been nothing but media noise about the deeds of the personality cult. Social science is in no hurry to comprehensively analyze Stalin's "legacy" and accurately position its theoretical accents. And yet **practice is forcing us to embark on the demolition of tenacious stereotypes which run contrary to life itself. What is needed here is the boldness to lay hands on established party practices.**

For 2 years now we have been working to ensure that the party apparatus actually strives to fulfill the gorkom's decisions and gives the elected aktiv assistance in fulfilling its functions and fulfilling them more than just formally. To get away from constantly supplanting soviet and economic organs and to focus all energy on practical assistance to party links in labor collectives, we strove to take a fresh look at the functions of the apparatus itself, functions which are constrained by its structure.

We are being carefully watched from the sidelines by the party obkom which reacts with no enthusiasm to our quests. Its stance is easily explained: Paragraph 23 of the CPSU Statute says unambiguously: "The structure and staff of the party apparatus are determined by the CPSU Central Committee." Thus, at the first stage of our transformations, we are acting within the framework of the existing table of organization and staff structure. Within this framework, we risked only to review the traditional allocation of duties: We abolished the Organizational Department and divided its functions among all the other departments. But the more political meaning we give to our work, the more it contradicts the formalities. The implacable law of dialectics demands action from us.

While interpreting the experience of party building which started accumulating during the first years of peace under Lenin and comparing it against the tasks of our restructuring, we must answer this question: Why is it that even today "the two wheels are not turning simultaneously?" Lenin answered it thus at the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Congress: "We have developed an incorrect relationship between the party and the soviet institutions." We would be going away from Lenin's approaches toward the solution of the problem by concluding that only an organizational restructuring of the party gorkom from within will make it possible to remove its tutelage of soviets and make soviets the sole organs of power at local level.

The new apparatus model which we propose does away with the offices of first, second, and third secretary. Only one secretary is left to lead three departments: Primary Organizations in All National Economic Spheres, Propaganda, and General. The party apparatus, thus reduced to one-third of its former size, will deal with political work and cadres through direct contacts with primary organizations. Energetic daily practice will enable the apparatus to achieve high quality standards in preparing questions for examination by plenums and bureau sessions. Acting as two-way conductors, the apparatchiks will not only notify primary party organizations of any decisions that have been adopted but will also organize and monitor their execution.

It is also necessary to review in light of democratization the traditional structure of gorkom bureaus which, in addition to leaders of soviet, party, and economic organs, should recruit at least one-half of their members from ordinary workers in different spheres who are capable of doing political work and are known as such among Communists. We will thus be in a position to abandon the prevailing practice whereby leaders monitor not only the party organization's work but also their own work, and to ensure effective monitoring of the gorkom apparatus' work from below.

The proposed structure of the apparatus and of the gorkom and its bureau boosts the role of the plenum as an organ of collective leadership and enhances the accountability of the apparatus and of the bureau to the plenum. Under this model, in particular, the party newspaper will move away from the subjectivist influence of apparatus officials and will regain its position as the press organ of the entire party committee. Its editor will be personally responsible to the gorkom plenum.

We in Iskitim have already adopted the practice whereby the first secretary only opens plenum sessions which are actually chaired by ordinary gorkom members.

It seems to us that **such a disposition of forces will make it possible to boost the authority of collective leadership and will rule out any chance of party command.** Even though we took a chance and ran a risk by embarking on a redistribution of functions within the apparatus, we are convinced that **life also dictates a radical change of its structure.** Frankly speaking, we were afraid that our ideas might appear as harebrained schemes. But an all-union symposium on the social and philosophical problems of restructuring was held a few days ago, organized by the Academy of Social Sciences at the Novosibirsk Higher Party School. It appeared that the experience described by gorkom and raykom secretaries runs along the same lines as our own experience in Iskitim. This experience confirms the persistent need for changes in party committees at rayon, city, and oblast level. **Their sectorial structure and the clamps of old structural forms apply the brakes on initiatives for work in the new fashion.** Yu. Serkov, first secretary of the Kolchuginskiy CPSU Raykom in the city of Leninsk-Kuznetskiy, and A. Barzykin, secretary of Irkutsk's Sverdlovskiy CPSU Raykom, spoke in ardent terms about this at the plenum. I join them in expressing this hope: We are impatiently awaiting the 19th party conference and hope that our approaches and endeavors will be reflected at this major consultation of Communists. After all, **we all must together and immediately solve a most important question: What are the ways to democratize and restructure life in our own party home?**

A. Muranov, first secretary of the Iskitim Party Gorkom, Novosibirsk Oblast

May Day Represents Soviets' Responsibility

PM0305131788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 88 Second Edition p 1

[Editorial: "We Are Working, Struggling, and Creating Under Red Banners"]

[Text] May Day... This day occupies a special place in the annals of the world workers' movement and our party's history. During the first May Day holidays Russia's proletariat, in Lenin's words, used to celebrate "their awakening to light and knowledge, their unification into one fraternal union for the struggle against all oppression, all tyranny, and all exploitation, and for the socialist organization of society." After the October Revolution, May Day became for the working class, the

working people of the Soviet land, and the world's progressive people a veritable review of forces and achievements in the struggle for peace, democracy, and social development.

On such a day we see more clearly that the dreams of the workers of Krasnaya Presnya and the weavers of Ivanovo-Voznesensk have become a reality and part of life. Soviet people do not forget that today's successes and future achievements were secured by the labor and struggle of a whole succession of generations. Our first steps in building the new life were directed by Vladimir Ilich Lenin. He is with us even now. Lenin's comrades in arms, who established the heroic traditions of Bolshevism and maintained an unswerving loyalty to communist ideals through all the adversities and trials which befell them, will live on in Soviet people's grateful memory forever. The unity of the generations is indissoluble: In the May Day columns the veteran's red ribbon and the school child's Young Pioneer scarf symbolize fidelity to October and fidelity to the banner of Lenin and the Communist Party which he created.

This, our customary and at the same time inimitable festival is filled with a sublime meaning. Our people are greeting the present May Day with particular feeling. Three years have have passed since the historic April Central Committee plenum. It may now be said with certainty that the decisions of principle taken at that time are proving correct. The path chosen by the party meets life's needs. It was embodied by the 27th Congress into a precise strategy and a clear program of actions. The line of the April plenum and the congress has been continued by the January and June (1987) plenums, which validated the concept of revolutionary restructuring and gave it a firm practical footing.

The pace of restructuring has acquired tangible form. This is demonstrated by the labor successes which many collectives brought to the May Day celebration. The recently published results of the fulfillment of the state plan for the economic and social development of the USSR in the first quarter of 1988 attest to the further growth of social production and production efficiency and the improvement in the people's well being. But according to established tradition we speak on festivals not so much about the successes as about the unresolved problems and about what has still to be done. Restructuring is proceeding intolerably slowly. Accelerate restructuring and restructure for the sake of acceleration—that is the real dialectic of our day.

The May Day review enables us to see more clearly how people's attitude to labor and to the fulfillment of their production obligations is changing. This is very much connected with the practical support which working people give to the party's line and with the current transfer of many economic sectors to new methods of economic management and progressive forms of labor organization. The entry into force of the Law on the State Enterprise was an incentive to the activity of labor collectives. Not everything is going smoothly here, there are still quite a few problems and difficulties that arise. But the important thing is that working people themselves are taking part in overcoming them. The new principles of economic management were also built into the basis of the Law on the Cooperative System in the USSR. The implementation of that law's ideas will mean a qualitatively new stage in the development not only of the cooperative movement but of all society.

May Day is a demonstration of working people's independent creative activity. Man is the main character of restructuring. Every step along its path must be seen and evaluated on a human scale. Our society needs citizens who are educated, who hold convictions, and who are dedicated to socialism and at the same time are active, restless, and who know how to live and work in conditions of democratization, collectives' economic independence, and an atmosphere of increasing economic and social responsibility for themselves and the country. The education reform outlined by the Central Committee February (1988) Plenum is expected to help mold such individuals. It is through further democratization and truly revolutionary thought and action that it is possible to eliminate social passivity and civic apathy and arouse working people's social and political activeness.

The spring breeze stirs the panels of crimson cloth. It was under red banners that Lenin's Bolsheviks, the party of revolutionaries, the party of innovators fought and triumphed. When the CPSU embarked upon revolutionary restructuring it began with itself. Restructuring must affect every party member. Working people will follow only that Communist for whom the cause of restructuring has become the point of life and a question of honor. We are less than 2 months away from the 19th all-union party conference, which is expected to discuss ways of achieving the further democratization of society and of the party itself. But it is already clear today that the process of democratic transformations is irreversible and that the CPSU is at its head.

The representatives of the more than 100 nations and ethnic groups in the USSR march side by side in the May Day columns. The friendship of the peoples—the greatest gain of the October Revolution—has withstood more than one test. The solution of any economic, social, environmental, or cultural problem affects every people's interests. As life shows, there must be special tact and goodwill here. The use of the tremendous potential of internationalism accumulated in our country during the implacable struggle against the attempts to set one people against another and to undermine the friendship existing between them—that is the party's line in the sphere of national relations.

When celebrating May Day the Soviet people ardently greet and congratulate working people in the fraternal socialist countries. Our internationalist principle is that when undertaking anything important or significant at home, it is necessary to thoroughly consider its effects on

the entire socialist community. Restructuring is working and will continue to work to strengthen socialism as a whole. It is necessary to deepen the fraternal cooperation among the socialist countries and make it more dynamic.

"May, Peace"—these words are being repeated in all the languages of the world today. Socialism and peace are indivisible. For us, May Day means a demonstration by the people, who need peaceful skies for successful progress along the road of restructuring. The CPSU and the Soviet state are pursuing a consistent peace-loving peace based on the primacy of general human values and an innovative foreign policy. The peoples have become tired of tension and confrontation. They support the search for a safer and more secure world. The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan were important milestones on this difficult path.

...Endless rows of marching people, flowers, banners, music—those are the symbols of May Day. Soviet people greet the holiday of peace and labor with a sense of responsibility for the cause of restructuring, for the country, for socialism, and for the strengthening of peace on earth.

Beria Case Investigator Gives TV Interview

LD301625 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1920 GMT 29 Apr 88

[From the "View" program; interview with Gennadiy Afanasiyevich Terekhov, merited lawyer of the RSFSR who participated in the investigation into the activities of Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria, by journalist Yelena Kavoleva; date and place not given—live or recorded; participants identified by screen caption]

[Text] [Presenter] Today we would like to remind you of an event that happened 35 years ago. At the end of 1953 subscribers to the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA received through their mailboxes the following notification: Subcribers to the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, the State Scientific Publishing House of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA recommends that you should remove from Volume 5 pages 21 through 24, as well as the portrait inserted between pages 22 and 23. You are being sent pages with a different text to replace them. These pages should be removed with scissors or a razor blade, preserving the margin near the spine to which the new pages should be glued. [signed] The State Scientific Publishing House of the GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA. These four pages contained a summary of the biography of a man whose name inspired fear in people for many years: Beria. Enemy of the people—the label Beria applied to his victims—was more precisely applicable to him than to anyone else. Our program today includes an interview with one of the investigators who worked on his case in those years.

[Kovaleva] I have here in front of me a copy of PRAVDA for Friday, 10 July 1953. This edition carries a report on the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, having examined a report from the USSR Council of Ministers, has decreed that Beria be removed from the posts of first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR minister of internal affairs, and that the case of Beria's criminal actions be handed over for examination by the USSR Supreme Court.

Did you meet Levrentiy Pavlovich Beria before July 1953? Did you know him?

[Terekhov] Yes, I had occasion to meet him as I was working in the USSR Procuracy. I was deputy chief of a department and there were various interdepartmental conferences at which I saw him. He seemed to be a very polite and courteous man, very cunning.

[Kovaleva] Gennadiy Afanasiyevich, I will quote from PRAVDA again, but this one from December 1953. Here is what is written: A report from the USSR Procuracy. It has been established by investigation that in the following years Beria maintained and expanded his secret, criminal links with foreign intelligence services through spies sent in by them and who he occasionally managed to protect from exposure and deserved retribution. Well, tell us, was this simply a declarative phrase or was it proved in the process of investigation?

[Terekhov] I can tell you what specific charges were laid against him. After Beria's arrest, a search was made which included his office. Behind his office there was a restroom and behind the restroom were his personal archives, a room which only he, himself, entered. There he kept various of his documents. During the search, the dossier of an agent of the Musavat [Azerbaijani opposition group] intelligence services in his name was found there. It turned out that he had been a secret official of the Musavat intelligence services in Baku in 1919 at the time when the British were in control and when this Musavat intelligence service was only a branch of the British intelligence services. It was not clear from this matter what tasks he had been given or how he carried them out, but the fact of his membership in this intelligence service was already a crime. Furthermore, he had contacts on his own initiative with representatives of Hitler's Germany.

[Kovaleva] Was this proved?

[Terekhov] This was proved because I personally questioned the person who formed the link between Beria's people and people of Hitler's Germany. This was the ambassador of one of the neutral states in Moscow through whom the talks were conducted. The talks, themselves, the very fact of such talks during the war, were a betrayal of the homeland, treachery. I went abroad to talk to this ambassador, now an ex-ambassador who is retired. He told me everything, including

who the intermediaries were from Beria's side, here in Moscow. He told me their codenames, but they were later discovered in Moscow.

[Kovaleva] Was this conversation with the ambassador official or unofficial?

[Terekhov] I committed a blunder over this conversation, of course because it did not get him to sign it right away. The next morning, when he came to our embassy, he refused to sign it saying that his wife forbade him to sign such a paper. However, when I asked him whether what he had said the day before and what was written here was true, all the same, he said that all of this was absolutely true, but that he would not sign it because he feared that other states might cause him injury.

[Kovaleva] So you lost the fight with his wife?

[Terekhov] Women always win.

[Kovaleva] Apart from links with foreign intelligence services, even during Beria's lifetime there were rumors circulating in Moscow about him simply as a Don Juan. Was this investigated?

[Terekhov] I was engaged in investigating that section and it fell to me to personally carry out this work. When Beria was arrested, a small piece of paper was found on one of his chief guards, (Sarkisov) or (Nadaray). On the paper were four women's names and telephone numbers. It turned out that these were women Beria had found somewhere. (Nadaray) and (Sarkisov) had dragged them in their car to Beria's house in (Smolnyy) alley and there he had forced them to sleep with him. He raped one of them, a 16-year-old girl, and this was included in the charges as a rape.

[Kovaleva] Gennadiy Afanasiyevich, was the investigative group satisfied by the material of the investigation, with the investigation? Were you satisfied by your work?

[Terekhov] This is like seeing a man scooping water out of the ocean in a glass and asking him, have you scooped all of the water out of the ocean? No. Do you hope to scoop it all out someday? No. Then why are you doing it?

World War II 'Traitor' Sentenced to Death

LD291635 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1555 GMT 29 Apr 88

[Text] Kiev, 29 Apr (TASS)—Nikolay Drozd, a traitor to the motherland, who collaborated with the Hitlerites during the years of World War II, has been sentenced to the supreme punishment, the death penalty. His trial ended today in Chernigov (the Soviet Ukraine).

It was established that Nikolay Drozd, an inhabitant of the village of Velikiy Listven in Chernigov Oblast, voluntarily entered service with a punitive batallion in Chernigov and participated personally, together with the Hitlerite occupiers, in mass executions of Soviet citizens in the Yatsevo concentration camp and a number of Ukrainian villages and towns. The fascists and members of punitive batallions shot dead or burned alive over 200 people and destroyed 215 buildings with outhouses in the village of Yatsevo alone in 1943.

When the Soviet Army began to approach Chernigov, Drozd returned to his village, where people did not know about his crimes. Drozd was called up into the army after the liberation of Velikiy Listven by Soviet forces and worked in a kolkhoz after the war. But even many years later the killer did not escape retribution.

Uzbek Affair: Worst Crimes Since World War II

LD301156 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 29 Apr 88

[Text] What is the Uzbek affair? Experts say this is the worst ever series of crimes since World War II in terms of the scale of embezzlement and the political, economic and social damage. Svetlana Yakimenko:

[Yakimenko] The case is rooted in what's been called years of stagnation. The inquiry into the affair was launched 5 years ago. A team of 100 people headed by the senior investigator in charge of especially grave cases at the office of the USSR'S Procurator-General (Terman Gliyan), has since worked in the Soviet Central Asian Republic of Uzbekistan, and as to what they found, we shall mention just some of the aspects of this case; like bribes for appointment to senior posts, also starting or suspending legal proceedings, and heavy statistics rigging. In the cotton industry statistical fraud has cost the nation 4 billion [currency not specified] Everything was bought and sold—government awards, seats in the legislature and other governing bodies, college education certificates, and senior posts. (Terman Gliyan) once likened what he and his team had been doing to an offensive looking more like an all-round defense. What he has in mind is the close links connecting criminals already detained and those who are still to be disclosed and strong resistance to the investigation.

Meanwhile the investigators have been doing everything to be at least 1 day, or one step ahead of the ciminals. In some cases they have had to travel from one area to another by army plane, or by air tickets using false identity. So far the inquiry has been confined mostly to Uzbekistan and the case itself has been called the Uzbek case. However, senior investigator (Terman Gliyan) is against this interpretation.

[Begin (Gliyan) recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] There is only one case I know of, that of corrupt high-ranking officials. Some would like to create a precedent of a regional case to lend it ethnic flavor. But we've already found that there are much more deeper, criminal ties going far beyond the bounds of Uzbekistan, as far as Moscow. Some of these ties lead

to senior officials who have so far retained their posts. These people have been seriously interfering in the investigation. [end recording]

Weekly Praises Rykov's Role in History
LD021956 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 2 May 88

[From the review of periodicals]

[Text] Restructuring is a difficult and contradictory process. The sooner society gets rid of the burden of past mistakes and errors, the more resolutely it bids farewell to the indirect employment of oversimplification and rigid dogmas, the more successful the course of renewal and the assertion of the principles of humanism that make up the essence of the socialist system will be. We have spoken about this in connection with the following: As has already been reported, the USSR Supreme Court plenum has revoked the sentence given by the military collegium regarding the accused, Bukharin, Rykov, and other persons and dismissed the case owing to the absence in their actions of anything that could be considered a crime. Quite a lot has already been written about Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin. Less has been written about Aleksey Ivanovich Rykov.

If you take a look at the 18th issue of the weekly "VETERAN", then you will find that Rykov was one of those who, together with Lenin, stood at the helm of the world's first state of workers and peasants. In 1918, he was appointed chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. In 1922, he was elected a member of the Party Central Committee Politburo. After the death of Vladimir Ilich, Aleksey Ivanovich became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. At the same time, he was confirmed in the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

An inalienable trait of his as a new type of leader was that he would make an indepth analysis of the state of affairs based on the creative application of Leninist methods. That contradicted the practice of the time. In 1938, an open trial was held of the so called anti-Soviet rightwing Trotskiyite bloc. Rykov was also among the accused. It was asserted that, on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states hostile to the Soviet Union, they had formed a conspirational group that had made its goal spying, sabotage, acts of sabotage, terror, and undermining the USSR's military might. Moreover, Rykov was accused of being a party to the murder of Kirov, of organizing uprisings by the kulaks, of shadowing government vehicles for the purpose of killing Stalin, Yezhov, and other leaders. On 13 March Aleksey Ivanovich was sentenced to the maximum penalty.

When we talk now about what happened in our history, least of all do we do so to quench the thirst of narrow-minded curiosity. No, it is first and foremost for the truth, mainly for lessons for the present and future.

Burlatskiy Leads Human Rights Commission Session
LD0305203288 Moscow TASS in English 1750 GMT 3 May 88

[Text] Moscow May 3 TASS—The commission for international cooperation on humanitarian issues and human rights at the Soviet committee for European security and cooperation has held its regular session.

The public commission, chaired by Fedor Burlatskiy, heard and discussed a report by Soviet Deputy Minister of Justice Nikolay Osetrov on upgrading Soviet legislation to meet commitments stemming from the Helsinki Final Act and international covenants on human rights.

The commission discussed international relations which facilitated a constructive dialogue, exchange of experience and the search for the most successful solutions to humanitarian issues and observance of human rights.

It positively assessed the results of the commission delegation's trip to the Vienna meeting of 35 nations on security and cooperation in Europe, its contacts with the delegations from the United States, Britain, France and other Western countries, talks with the International Helsinki Human Rights Committee, the Human Rights Commission of the Socialist International and the Austrian public.

Gilashvili Awarded Order on 70th Birthday
LD011758 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 1 May 88

[Text] Pavel Georgiyevich Gilashvili, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Georgian SSR, has been awarded the Order of Friendship of Peoples by decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium for his long years of fruitful work in party, local Soviet, and Komsomol bodies, and in connection with his 70th birthday.

Moscow Party Chief Attends Mausoleum Ceremony
PM021825 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 88 p 1

[TASS report: "Wreaths Laid"]

[Text] An endless stream of people through Red Square. Soviet people and foreign visitors display the respect and gratitude due to Vladimir Ilich Lenin, founder of the Communist Party and creator of the world's first socialist state. Our people, implementing profound revolutionary transformations, are checking their life against Lenin.

On 22 April, the 118th anniversary of Ilich's birth, the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum was visited by members and candidate members of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom and Obkom Bureaus and leaders of the Moscow City and

Oblast Soviets. Wreaths were laid at the V.I. Lenin Mausoleum on behalf of the party gorkom and obkom and the city and oblast soviets.

L.N. Zaykov, Politburo member and CPSU Central Committee secretary and first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom, took part in the wreath-laying ceremony.

Kolbin on Kazakh Situation, Inter-Nation Ties
PM271425 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 88 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, by special correspondents G. Dildyayev, T. Yesilbayev, and A. Petrushov, under the rubric "Thoughts Before the Party Conference": "How Kinship Is Strengthened; On the Problems of Restructuring and Contemporary Inter-Nation Relations"; date not given—boldface as published]

[Text] Alma-Ata—[Correspondents] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, restructuring in Kazakhstan is arousing a great deal of interest among PRAVDA readers. Letters are coming from everywhere. That is why, when preparing for this conversation, we decided that it would be best to base it on the editorial mail, which is now more prolific and varied than it has ever been.

[Kolbin] I agree. I can also use this discussion to go some way toward answering the many letters that have been sent to the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, particularly those addressed personally to me.

[Correspondents] The press has already carried a considerable number of reports on the events in Alma-Ata in December 1986. But people still want to know more. Typically, people are not motivated by a narrow-minded passion for the "juicy" details, but by the desire to understand the reasons for what happened and find out how the effects of the events are being dealt with. Readers are concerned that some people have begun to try to distort these events to suit their own vested interests, instill false premises in the minds of their contemporaries and sometimes offer arrogant explanations, and make political capital after the event.

[Kolbin] Such attempts have been made and will probably recur in the future. But we have a powerful weapon to counter these attempts—the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the Work of the Kazakh Republic Party Organization Concerning the International and Patriotic Education of the Working People." This document has fundamental significance for the entire party. It helps us to draw political lessons from what has happened. It should also be carefully studied by anyone who wants to understand and interpret the underlying reasons for the events in the Baltic and Transcaucasian regions. After all, for many years we have all lived smug in the belief that the national problem in our country was solved long ago. Hence the unrestrained toasts to inviolable friendship, the mindless reports of "flourishing" and "merging," and opportunist treatises of a eulogistic nature. But the real problems posed by life have been glossed over. Basically the subject of national relations has been devoid of critical analysis. Meanwhile, national policy must be studied constantly and in depth, as noted at the February CPSU Central Committee plenum. Moreover, it must be considered in every aspect—in theory and in practice. Without this, we cannot really democratize social life.

I have no wish to deprive philosophers and social scientists of their livelihood—it is their job to support or dispute the arguments of those who claim that when a people (and the Kazakh people in particular) are making the transition from one social formation to another—from feudalism to socialism—the "ripples" left by prejudices that still persist even now are naturally inevitable. To be honest, I can see no real point in these arguments. Something else is more important to me in practical work: Many people, including the very brightest, are intoxicated by a sense of national exclusivity. In my opinion, the reasons for this must be explained in political rather than philosophical terms, and by the level of philosophical culture and education rather than ethnopsychology.

What have our eyes been opened to, and what are we talking about today without any false constraint? Internationalism is an exceptionally broad concept. As far as I am concerned, it presupposes the desire, willingness, and ability to painstakingly gather everything that will contribute to drawing people together rather than pushing them apart. But this is only possible if there is deep respect for the dignity, culture, language, and history of every people and mutual contact between them. But, you must agree, this noble sentiment is not genetic and does not appear of its own accord. Every effort must be made to cultivate it. We do not now intend to turn our backs on anything that prevents this, provokes national insult, or excites pride, and we will not tolerate low standards in this respect. We are discussing, seeking, and testing means and methods of handling interethnic relations. In short, even this delicate area has been affected by the process of democratization and glasnost.

I think it would be naive to take the events in Alma-Ata at face value from an ideological standpoint. No people has a spiritual basis for nationalism and chauvinism. Working people of different nationalities easily understand each other and have a clear, untroubled perception of life. It is most often the case that the shadow of mutual distrust and the shroud of arrogance arise when ethics and morality are deformed and the norms and principles of party leadership and the Soviet way of life are violated. In Kazakhstan, this began with the distortion of Leninist cadre policy, when family ties and the attendant vestiges of the past began to be used everywhere.

Cronyism created a situation of group protection and mutual protection. Hence the corruption and bribery. Inveterate schemers and self-seekers who balk at nothing have gained the upper hand. They are responsible for spreading rumors, organizing anonymous letters, and persecuting people not to their liking. Their aim is simple: to shed responsibility for economic disorders, bureaucracy, and shortcomings in the supply system and conceal their own moral bankruptcy.

Take this fact, for example. Everything possible was done to prevent the riots in Alma-Ata in December. Many leaders addressed the people gathered in the square—every word of authority was valuable to us at the time. Before feelings reached fever pitch, the Central Committee Bureau suggested that D.A. Kunayev speak to the people and explain the essential political nature of the decision taken by the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee plenum to relieve him of his post as first secretary of the Central Committee. They hoped that this would dispel the tension and knock the ground from beneath the feet of provocateurs and demagogues. He categorically refused, however. For that reason, the events in Alma-Ata are largely on his conscience.

The struggle for a pure life began with restructuring within the Communist Party itself and its leading organs. The bureau has been substantially renewed. Everyone who undermined the authority of the Central Committee has been removed from it. Many people have been relieved of their duties in the Central Committee apparatus because they cannot be trusted. Last year alone, 1,200 members of MVD organs were relieved of their duties for lacking moral scruples. A total of 12 VUZ rectors have been dismissed in the republic on the same grounds. A merciless war has been declared on cronyism and bribery.

[Correspondents] Nevertheless, the PRAVDA mail contains a lot of complaints against leading personnel. "It seems to me," Candidate of Sciences A. Tazhibayev, former staffer at the Kazakh Scientific Research Institute of Veterinary Science, writes, "that they want to make me toe the line because I exposed bureaucrats and idlers. I have lost all hope of finding work in my specialized field. Wherever I apply, I always come face to face with people who persecuted me before." We have been told the same thing by Zh. Zimanov, R. Sharipov, K. Yedygenov, and others.

[Kolbin] It is hard for me to judge these particular instances—they would have to be looked into. But in principle this is serious. Immediately after the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum, the opponents of restructuring hastily began to reorganize their own ranks. Compromised officials were shifted sideways—so that they could be shielded by others. Others—from a secret reserve—were pulled upward after donning the armor of knights of restructuring. And with the long-term aim of "survival." They are now concerned with all-round defense and are persecuting those who have criticized their patrons. But we are aware of these gestures of expediency and know "who's who." When reports were given by elected organs, a total of 1,836 members of party committees and bureaus were replaced. Some 450 secretaries of primary and shop party organizations were newly elected. Obkom, gorkom, and raykom bureaus have been purged. Meetings and plenums have proposed that **if in practice a leader fails to live up to the trust placed in him, he must be replaced immediately without waiting for his term of office to end. In my opinion, this should be discussed at the all-union party conference.** The deeper restructuring goes, the more need there is to free ourselves of incompetent cadres who have lost their authority.

This cleansing process will be helped by reducing the size of the administrative apparatus. A total of 14 ministries and departments and 2 of the 19 oblasts are to be abolished. As a whole, the number of 132,000 administrative workers has already been cut by more than 33,000.

But let us return to the main subject of our conversation. There is no doubt that a timely solution to social problems will help—by exerting a beneficial influence on the growth of national self-awareness—to prevent diseased shoots from appearing on this developing tree of national distinctiveness and to graft the culture of international feeling onto it. Real improvement in the situation in the republic has been helped not so much by "punitive," destructive measures as by constructive measures. For example, a real move from the standstill reached in the housing problem has done more to establish social justice and strengthen friendship among the peoples than dozens of the old pompous sessions and hundreds of speeches about unity and fraternity.

Improvements have also been made in the population's food supply. These improvements did not come out of thin air either. More feed was procured for farms over the summer—which had an immediate effect on livestock productivity growth. State orders are now beginning to be met and produce in excess of the plan is being channeled into the retail trade network. There is a particularly wide range of meat products available in Kokchetav, Kustanay, and Tselinograd oblasts, where they have succeeded in increasing people's personal interest in the development of agricultural production and have boldly begun to develop new forms of cooperation.

But on the whole the economy is still in a serious situation. The financial side of things is a source of serious concern. The money owed by enterprises and organizations to the banks exceeds R1.5 billion. The only way out of the breach is through radical economic reform. Economic accountability is already taking effect: Where it is operating at full strength, things are moving and the results are evident. A great deal depends on how

rapidly democratic norms of interpersonal relations gain in strength. In this sense, the restructuring of society is simultaneously a highly complex process of restructuring inter-nation relations.

[Correspondents] How are you approaching the problems in this complex and delicate sphere?

[Kolbin] First of all, we have laid down clear guidelines for ourselves: When we encounter signs of nationalist prejudice, we must not dramatize events or fall into a panic. Without exception this only plays into the hands of extremists and social demagogues. We are learning to deal with difficulties painlessly, and we discuss everything in this respect frankly and honestly. Difficulties arise when a person known as a nationalist or a chauvinist considers himself a patriot. That is why criticism of his feelings and ideas often prompts such a strong reaction. This must be taken into consideration. These problems are being studied as they arise by the commissions on national and inter-nation relations which have been formed under the Central Committee and party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms. Sectors responsible for national relations have been organized in the propaganda and agitation departments of the Central Committee and party obkoms. Life has shown that these subdivisions are necessary. Incidentally, we do not see ourselves as pioneers in this respect. Sectors like these existed in the union republics' Central Committees and obkoms until the thirties.

The commission sessions are certainly not "academic exercises": There are many disputes, different emotions, and real clashes of opinion. This is understandable: The issues being discussed are not straightforward.

After a painstaking analysis of specific situations, we have approved a recommendation on a leader's personal responsibility for the state of the moral and psychological climate in his collective and for the level of inter-nation relations in that collective. A leader's ability to foster a spirit of internationalism in people is now definitely taken into account during the certification procedure and the renewal of his character reference.

A method of approach which excludes the possibility of cadres' being mechanically selected on national grounds has also been approved, which is helping to eliminate the infamous practice whereby office is "inherited." A lot of words have been wasted in the arguments over the percentage ratio of nations and their representatives in various organs. We are opposed to "arithmetical" operations in this respect. We should be concerned with seeking, training, and backing people committed to the common cause rather than to subtraction and division. This approach alone is fair and will offend no one. But we cannot tolerate blatant distortions. To maintain proportions is one of the natural aims of cadre policy.

[Correspondents] Gennadiy Vasilyevich, the next range of questions from our mailbag is connected with language study in schools and kindergartens. Many readers are interested in the "bilingual principle" itself and in its real application in practice.

[Kolbin] The bilingual principle.... There are many aspects here: social, cultural, legal, emotional, and those affecting everyday life. There are also political aspects. When we see that there are more and more conscripts coming from Guryev and Taldy-Kurgan oblasts with a poor knowledge of Russian, that is not just a linguistic but a state problem. Why is this happening? We are discovering, for example, that in remote regions where the population is almost 100-percent Kazakh, even the Russian language teachers themselves have a poor knowledge of the language. Russian teaching generally is very poorly organized.

This, I believe, should be borne in mind by us all. Russian became the language of inter-nation communication for historical reasons and not as a result of a decree from above. This is a reality, just as it is a reality that the USSR is a polyethnic, multinational society, where every national language must feel it has full value.

Bilingualism is a requirement in the national republics. The question of Kazakh language teaching in schools and kindergartens was already a serious issue here a year ago. But why, one asks? Who prevented the former leadership from doing what is being done now? New classes and groups have been opened throughout the republic in line with laws and instructions. They are tailored to meet requirements. They teach not only teach Kazakh, but German, Uighur, Kurdish, and Polish are also offered. The Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's government have approved special resolutions to improve Kazakh and Russian language teaching. We work on the basis that we must establish bilingualism (voluntarily, of course) and not just talk about the need to do so, because this clouds what is generally a clear-cut issue. I cannot see why, but previously it was only given the hard sell without ever getting down to real decisions and real action. The necessary dictionaries, textbooks, and phrasebooks have now been published in a short space of time and circles have been organized to study the languages of indigenous and Russian nationalities. This has become a need for people living in the republic.

The CPSU Central Committee February Plenum said that we should more often recall Lenin's behest that the cause of internationalism and friendship among peoples are best served by the practice of Russian and native language teaching in one general school rather than in different schools. This is also greatly helped by the joint education of children of different nationalities in children's institutions.

Yes, the drawing together of nations is a long dialectical process, but creating artifical restraints on this process means lowering oneself to a mimicry of internationalism.

[Correspondents] We would also like to touch on the question of traditions, which have likewise become a subject of dispute and discussion.

[Kolbin] Here, too, there must be a sense of moderation. When this fails, even the very best tradition becomes its own opposite. Take the following example. Kazakhs—and other peoples too, incidentally—clearly express their respect for their elders, or aksakals, literally translated as "the white bearded ones." This is fine! Over the last two decades, however, this word also began to be used to dignify people in senior office, although some "aksakals" are only 25-30 years old. Was this not a source of the cult of rank, with all the attendant consequences? And was this metamorphosis accidental? Of course not. It was precisely at this time that the struggle against feudal-landowner morality and patriarchal-ancestral customs essentially waned. But it is one of the brilliant pages in the history of the Kazakh Communist Party. Much was achieved on this path. Bride money, polygamy, and other conservative customs virtually disappeared. But in the years of stagnation they began to be revived again.

In short, the offensive in this neglected area of ideology must be conducted across the board and by varied means. But the most important thing is individual work.

I would like to repeat: We say frankly that leaders at the top are entirely responsible for the atmosphere in their collective. Hard? It could not be otherwise. There has been too much big talk about friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. The time has come to give some substance to these words. Lenin taught us to "know how to be... an internationalist in reality," and it is our duty to remember this behest.

To be honest, I am most of all excited by the headstart we have made in work concerning international and patriotic education in preparation for the all-union party conference and the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee plenum. We must prepare constructive proposals for them. Some have already been verified and have justified themselves in practice.

Whom will people follow? Who will unite them? Yes, it is a question of leadership. The time demands bold, energetic leaders free of the fetters of the past. Leaders who have strong authority by virtue of their personality rather than because of the office they hold. I believe that if we were to arrange a test today in the form of a popular vote, not everyone would pick up a "pass mark." For example, N. Davydov, former first secretary of the Dzhezkazgan party obkom, did not have a single good word said about him at the plenum which saw his retirement. A sad outcome which offers a lot of food for thought.

I think that the political life of functionaries like this will now be shortlived. I am gratified by the "chief requests" I hear at meetings with people who live in Kzyl-Orda, Tselinograd, and Kokchetav oblasts: Do not take our first secretary away from us. Yerkin Nurzhanovich Auelbekov, Andrey Georgiyevich Braun, and Makhtay Ramazanovich Sagdiyev have won authority by their actions.

Not a great deal of time has passed since the bad memories of December 1986. But how the nature of the letters sent to the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and its Bureau has changed! They contain support and approval, and practical, concerned advice. We draw strength and confidence for our work from them.